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Chapter One 
The Problem and its Background  
1.0 Introduction  
In pursuing this research, it is my intention to broaden our understanding of a unique 
segment of the United States’ immigrant community through testing and further 
developing theories on immigrant integration in a comparative context of Yemeni 
immigrants, and comparatively assessing those data with already published data on 
Lebanese-Americans in addition to sample interviews. Metropolitan Detroit has one of 
the world’s largest concentrations of Middle Eastern immigrants; the largest groups 
within the Metro Detroit Arab American community are the Lebanese Shi’a, followed by 
the Yemenis, both Zaidis and Sunnis, and the Sunni Palestinians (Waugh, McIrvin, Abu-
Laban, & Qureshi, p. 257).  This examination of a highly traditional, impermeable and 
oftentimes controversial sector of the Muslim and Arabic communities, will prove 
invaluable in our understanding of immigrant communities and their roles and 
adjustments in U.S. society, and of expected patterns of immigrant settlement generally 
in their new host societies.  Additionally, governments have an interest in policies that 
enable new settlers to develop a sense of belonging to the wider community, participate 
in all aspects of social, cultural and economic life, and be confident that they are coming 
into a country that is able to accept their difference and value their contribution 
(Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, and O’Neill, 2005, p. 86).  Such positive settlement outcomes 
benefit both the immigrant and host society, a current question of importance not only in 
North America but in Europe and elsewhere (Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, and 
O’Neill). Within immigrant communities, individuals may choose to accept (or not) 
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aspects of the host society’s culture; however, there are also social, political, economic 
and other specific challenges to integration that, if understood and overcome, could 
benefit the society as whole.   
Additionally, although I do not conduct interviews in this study, I did base my 
initial hypothesis on a set of pilot interviews.  This pilot study was based my dissertation 
interests and  it involved a convenience sample that consisted of interviewing three first-
generation Yemeni-Americans who were educated and deemed as community leaders 
and/or active members. Of the three interviewees, two were men who emigrated from 
Yemen to the U.S. for educational purposes and then decided to settle here.  The woman 
interviewee emigrated to the U.S. for marriage and settled here with her family while 
pursuing her education.  All three of the interviewees fell within a similar middle-class 
income range, thus no class or educational variance in this pre-test was conducted. 
The preliminary results of that study offered many insights on this community.  
First, despite all three interviewees having lived in the U.S. for over twenty years, they all 
shared a hope of returning to Yemen and expressed a shallow or weak form of acceptance 
by the non-Arab/non-Muslim community here in the host culture.  This feeling however 
may have been a result of their indecisions on whether or not they would remain in the 
U.S.  Further, all three interviewees indicated that most of their past desires to continue 
making a life here were weakened after the events of September 11, 2001, especially due 
to an increase in their first-hand experiences with “racism.”  Finally, all three 
interviewees explained that they have not experienced struggles with their identity while 
living here in the U.S.  However, they have noticed that the younger generations [their 
children and those children that they have worked with] of Yemeni-Americans have been 
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exceptionally susceptible to confusion in their identity being that many could not speak 
Arabic.  This weakness in Arabic directly affected these youth and their relations with 
their parents, especially those parents who could not speak English, by impeding on 
communication between each other which oftentimes created misunderstandings and 
frustrations.  Further, these youth were also struggling in their aims to fit into the society 
they grew up in while upholding the traditional values through culture and religion which 
their parents strongly instilled into them.  Interviews were recorded, transcribed and 
coded using the computer program, MAXqda2.   
 
1.1. Background of the Study 
      Historically, almost all Arab-Americans trace their origins to one of two large 
waves of immigration. The first started at the end of the 19th century, was driven by 
economic motives of migrants in search of work and better lives and included mostly 
Lebanese Christians. The second wave of Arab immigration came after the reopening of 
America’s gates to immigrants in 1965, and was amplified after the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war. This subsequent wave was more varied than the first, this time consisting of 
Palestinians, Yemenis and others escaping from tyranny or violence in their home 
countries.  
Researchers agree today that Yemenis began immigrating into the United States 
in the late 19th century.  According to Mary Bisharat, “Yemenis made their appearance in 
the U.S. shortly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1860; almost certainly a handful 
had come by 1890” (Bisharat, 1975, p. 203). The earliest immigrants came primarily 
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from the southern Yemen and the Aden protectorate, the area formally known as the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (or South Yemen).  Their reason for emigration 
was the extreme poverty of the land, worsened by British imperialism. Those migrants 
from the North however,  were originally very few in migration numbers due to the 
isolation imposed by the local ruler Imam Yahya; this migration pattern continued up 
until he was assassinated in 1948 (Bisharat,1975, pp. 22-26).  Therefore, it was not until 
the 1950s, 60s and primarily the 70s, that Yemeni immigration to the U.S. peaked until 
the most recent migration patterns, which consisted of the highest influx of Yemeni 
immigrants beginning in the 1990s just after the reunification of the Yemens. 
Most U.S. Yemeni communities were concentrated in primarily three states, 
namely, New York, Michigan and California (Swanson, 1979, p. 34).  In Michigan, the 
automobile industry had employed numerous Yemenis settling within the Metro Detroit 
area from the early 1900s, settling especially in Southeast Dearborn and Hamtramck.  
According to the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS), Yemeni-Americans today 
account for 9% (est. population 15,000) of the Arab population within the Metro Detroit 
region. In contrast, Lebanese-Americans account for roughly 37% of the Arab population 
within Metro Detroit and initially migrated for both economic reasons and due to the 
tumultuous civil war. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, approximately 30% of the 
ancestry in Dearborn is Arabic.  Dearborn also fares much better than Hamtramck in 
terms of higher estimated median household income, indeed faring better than the 
average in state of Michigan, at approximately $49,044 in 2007.  Within the South end of 
Dearborn however, the primarily Yemeni community is characterized as less affluent and 
working class, heavily reliant on the automotive industry (just as in the Hamtramck case) 
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and severely impacted by the downturn in the industry.  According to some of the 
demographics found in the DAAS, in career/job fields, Yemenis are more likely to work 
in the trades (43 percent, compared to a range of 7 to 17 percent for other Arabs and 
Chaldeans). Lebanese/Syrians have the highest proportion of those in professional 
occupations (29 percent compared to 5-19 percent).  Further, only 3% of Yemeni-
Americans were found to be business owners in comparison to Lebanese-American 
business owners who accounted for 21% of Metro Detroit Arab Americans.  In terms of 
family/household size, Yemeni-Americans hold the largest families with an average of 
3.8 children in comparison to Lebanese-Americans who account for 2.4 children.   
Yemeni-Americans have tended to differentiate themselves from other immigrant 
groups as well, including their Arab-American counterparts, by their rather insular mind-
set regarding immigration and assimilation within their host society. For instance, 
according to anthropologist Nabeel Abraham, “whereas all Arab workers are considered 
to be economically-motivated immigrants, the immigration of each particular group, such 
as the Yemenis, to the U.S. is a product of a specific set of historical, political, and socio-
economic circumstances.  These circumstances have a bearing on the group’s perspective 
toward life and work in the U.S., and just as importantly, on the immigrants’ relationship 
to the home country (Abraham, 1977, p. 4).  
 Further, the Yemeni-American population contrasts with the other Muslim 
demographics in several ways: "less educated and less fluent in English, but more strictly 
religious, they hold unskilled positions and send remittances back to family in Yemen, 
while shunning the influences of American society" (Belton, October 2003).   
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1.2 Nature of the Problem 
   It is important to study in greater depth the extent and types of integration or 
segregation of the Yemeni-American community in that there has been less effort to 
understand the patterns and problems toward immigrant integration of Yemeni 
immigrants than with other Arab immigrants.  In terms of origin, Yemen is a unique 
country to consider being that it has a strikingly diverse topography, socio-economic 
differences and a unique political history due to the British colonization of the south, the 
largely tribal far north, and the eventual, unification of the country.  
I intend to examine the levels of political integration among Yemeni-American 
immigrants by measuring variables which would reveal patterns of their political 
participation (voting, participation, contributions, and membership).  The literature on the 
integration of immigrants appears to struggle with the problem of defining the 
multidimensional concept of integration and measuring an appropriate outcome variable.   
Therefore, I will be basing the concept of integration as having a positive impact on 
economic success through three main channels, reflected in the three dimensions of 
political, social and economic integration, all of which relate to the issue of economic 
opportunities (Yang 1994, p. 455). 
For comparison, I will also measure cultural and economic integration of Yemeni 
and Lebanese immigrants as a comparison to reveal and better understand their 
potentially contrasting levels and types of political participation.  I will be examining the 
associations and relevant characteristics such as income, distinguishing Yemeni from 
Lebanese immigrants within each community.  Below, I explain in detail what is meant 
by political, socioeconomic and cultural integration per this dissertation. 
7 
 
 
Political Integration Background 
Political participation can be defined as taking part in or becoming involved in 
activities related to politics (Heelsum, 2002, p. 182).  Integration is ultimately all about 
the ongoing political struggle and the challenge of blending or “fitting in,” about 
populations in the city and how the immigrant groups themselves may or may not be able 
to work the conflictual system surrounding them to their own advantage, which might 
possibly also include the advantage of their former country of origin (Favell & 
Martiniello, 1999, p. 11).  Additionally, “political integration refers to the cohesiveness 
of the members of the political community, (Lamore, 1982, p. 169) in terms of their 
political values, beliefs, emotive traits, and activities” (Almond and Verba, 1965). While 
these can be a healthy form of identity building, in an excessive form they can also cut 
off and isolate the group from their fellow citizens. Although each host country 
somewhat reinvents its own history of nation building, the common concept of 
integration denotes the redefinition of national socio-political spaces to integrate new 
immigrants. Thus, integration implies the selective extension to non-nationals and new-
nationals of legal, social, cultural and political rights and opportunities that were once the 
exclusive entitlements of nationals (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2003, p. 19).  
In the context of what is precisely meant by immigrant integration, I refer to the 
inclusion of the new population into existing social structures and to the kind and quality 
of linking these new populations’ experience to the existing system of civic, 
socioeconomic, and cultural relations.  In particular, the political incorporation of 
immigrants as new citizens is central to theoretical reflection, political analysis and 
policy comparison with regard to immigrant integration (e.g. Bousetta, 1999; Favell, 
8 
 
 
2001; Jacobs, 1999, p. 18 of Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003).  With political integration, 
there would be a course of obtaining membership into the host society which would 
include citizenship, media usage, registration to vote, participation in demonstrations, 
signing petitions, voting, donations to or membership in political parties, involvement in 
political campaigns, contact with politicians, political group membership, running for 
political office and boycotting.  Overall, “a successful or progressing integration process 
could be characterized as increasing similarity in living conditions and ethnic-cultural 
orientations between immigrants and natives, and a decrease in ethnic stratification” 
(Heckmann, 2003, p. 3). 
Cultural Integration Background 
Cultural integration occurs when immigrants come to obtain membership within 
the host society which would include social interactions (frequency of contacts within 
host country and in comparison to country of origin), friendships, rules/norms behavior, 
marriages, voluntary associations, language usage and proficiency (specifically of 
English in the US), permanent status in the host country, and intermarriages. These 
reflect levels of exposure to and identification with the host society.  The persistence of a 
strong cultural identification with ones’ country of origin does not necessarily have a 
negative association with developing a sense of belonging to the new host society, but it 
does play a role in the process (Garcia, 1981, p.382).  In other words, the influence of 
cultural attachment/practices to one’s country of origin can serve as a depressing factor 
for engagement in collective activities in the host society, and/or suggests a longer period 
of adjustment/assimilation. 
 
9 
 
 
Economic Integration Background 
Moreover, with economic integration, there would be a course of obtaining 
membership status in the central institutions of the host society which would include 
status in the economic and labor market (employment and income levels), educational 
levels, and residential patterns (housing and segregation).  Such information though is 
nothing new in the literature, which often finds high correlations between political, social 
and economic integration.  For instance, in a fairly recent study on the integration of 
Turks in Germany, the researchers, Alexander Danzer & Hulya Ulku, noted that they 
found integration can positively impact economic success through three main channels, 
reflected in the three dimensions of integration (Yang, 1994):  political, social and 
economic integration, all of which relate to the issue of economic opportunities. 
Additionally, the researchers suggested that in order to have significant economic success 
brought about by integration, some combination of all three forms of integration might be 
necessary and that policies aiming at integration might need to focus on all three forms of 
integration if the aim is to aid migrants’ economic well-being (Danzer & Ulku, 2008, p. 
28).   
Furthermore, in the American context, integration can entail an upward social 
mobility where Verba, Nie and Kim emphasize the importance of socioeconomic status 
in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation 
(Verba, Nie & Kim 1972, p. 15).  Also, differential residential patterns are strongly 
related to socioeconomic inequality, so that high proportions of immigrants’ and 
economic disadvantage (e.g. more unemployment, lower income levels, and inferior 
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quality of housing) tend to coincide in the same urban neighborhoods (Jacobs & 
Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 9 of Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2000).   
Moreover, the assimilation thesis has its roots in the work of Gordon. According 
to this theory, immigrants, and recent immigrants most of all, may not be well enough 
assimilated to the world of work and the community to be able to get fully involved in 
politics (Gordon, 1964, p. 63). They adapt to their new economic environment in time, 
and then to the political environment, while their descendants are more entirely adapted. 
Thus integration or assimilation can be seen as a generationally-phased process. Reitz 
makes the same case in his explanation of the socioeconomic measurement of the 
relationship between ethnic identification and political participation (Reitz, 1980, p. 
380).  He argues that minority group members and new immigrants who are ineffective in 
the world of work are inclined to think that they are extraneous to the political process.  
For this reason, they are more likely to identify with their ethnic group, and less likely to 
participate in politics, than successful workers or successive generations. Thus, those who 
are high in socio-economic status feel more efficacious because of their greater economic 
success, and are, therefore, more likely to reject ethnic self-definitions and to become 
politically active (Reitz, 1980, p. 383). 
In summary, a multidimensional framework is essential to helping us understand 
the status of immigrant integration, especially, for this dissertation, being that little is 
known about Yemeni-Americans’ involvement with the U.S. political system. For 
example, are Yemenis unevenly integrated along the various dimensions, and in 
comparison to the Lebanese, and can one draw conclusions about whether and why they 
are they knowledgeable about or vitally concerned with the local or national political 
11 
 
 
system?  Do they participate in community organizations?  Do they seek to translate their 
traditions or group and national socio-political identification to the American context? 
 
1.2 Social Significance 
            This research is significant because of several problems faced by immigrant 
societies.  For instance, problems in economic integration may relate to insufficient 
access to quality jobs, or might reflect the lingering lack of applicable skills by the 
immigrant population. On the other hand, these disadvantages might also relate to their 
ability or interest in campaigning politically for greater recognition. The “transferable 
skills” of migrants are often not utilized and migrants see no alternative but to accept 
positions/jobs that are not at par with their actual skill level (Reitz, 2005, p. 3). Many 
studies have documented immigrants’ poor labor market outcomes (Borjas, 2004, website 
article). These outcomes are due in part to the low skills that many immigrants bring with 
them, and in part to immigrants’ loss of other elements of human capital (such as 
language and social networks) that enable individuals to make full use of their skills 
(Butcher and Piehl, 2005, p. 4). In addition, in many countries there is found to be a 
growing gap in income levels between immigrants and the native-born populations.  
According to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau Statistics, the annual median earnings of 
immigrants are only about 75 percent those of natives. And for the most recent 
immigrants, median earning is only 56 percent that of natives.   
Furthermore, in addition to factors such as educational levels, a key predictor of 
immigrant skill transferability, hence immigrants’ initial and subsequent earnings, is the 
source country’s level of economic development. Immigrants from countries with 
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economic opportunities resembling those in the U.S. tend to have earnings profiles 
resembling those of U.S. natives (Duleep & Dowhan, 2008, p. 46). Immigrants from 
economically developing countries tend to have lower initial earnings, but higher 
earnings growth than otherwise similar U.S. natives, although this can vary with such 
factors as immigrant emphasis on children’s educational attainment. Therefore, the 
source country’s level of economic development also appears to influence the 
relationship between an immigrant’s level of education and earnings growth (Duleep and 
Dowhan, 2008, p. 46).  In the context of this study, both Yemen and Lebanon are 
considered as developing countries, with Yemen falling much lower on the poverty scale 
than Lebanon and with Yemen’s population having lower education and skill levels 
(Duleep and Dowhan, 2008, p. 46).   Thus, it is likely that these differences will play out 
in their integration levels within the host society. 
Further, there is the problem of immigrant-specific poverty in urban areas. The 
2003 U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey reported that 44.4% of our nation’s 
immigrants live in a central city in a metropolitan area, compared to 26.9% of the native-
born.  For purposes of this dissertation, I will be focusing on the Yemeni-American 
communities living in two Michigan towns which are home to the largest Yemeni 
immigrant groups in the U.S. (with Dearborn being a larger percentage). Hamtramck is a 
small city (land area of 2.11 miles) surrounded by the city of Detroit, and is noted for its 
viable and affordable housing and property and for some continued industrial and 
business activity. This community has long been a magnet for eastern European 
immigrants and remains ethnically diverse, with a significant African-American 
population as well as recent immigrants from Europe (Bosnia), Asia (Bangladesh), and 
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the Middle East, with approximately 8.2% being Yemeni-Americans. According to the 
2010 U.S. Census, 8,869 of Hamtramck residents said they were born outside of the U.S., 
and 11,250 of its residents reported speaking a language other than English at home.  The 
median household income in 2010 was reported at $26,008 falling below the median 
poverty levels.1  
The second region under study is the southern end of Dearborn, where the largest 
population of Yemeni-American immigrants resides. Dearborn fares much better than 
Hamtramck in terms of higher estimated median household income, faring better than the 
average in state of Michigan, with approximately $49,044 in 2007.  Within the South end 
of Dearborn however, the primarily Yemeni community is characterized as working 
class, and heavily reliant on the automotive industry (just as in the Hamtramck case), and 
has had been severely impacted by the downturn in the industry.   
  
1.3 Purpose and Scope of the Study 
      In this proposed project, I intend to extend our understanding of Yemeni 
immigrants’ attitudes or behavior toward integration, and particularly political integration 
into American society by exploring the case of Yemeni-Americans in both Dearborn and 
Hamtramck, comparatively and in relation to Lebanese-Americans in the same region. 
Although the predictors of political integration vary by immigrant group, studies of 
political integration have focused primarily on the determinants of naturalization and 
differences in citizenship acquisition across different nationalities (Ports & Moro, 1985; 
Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994). There are typical similarities in the literature on this subject 
                                                          
1
 U.S. Census: Hamtramck, Michigan. Census 2010 Demographic Profile Highlights 
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with most empirical studies utilizing a host of factors, such as income, education, and 
length of exposure (Ports & Rumbaed, 1996; Jason and Rosenzweig, 1990).  By 
exploring the literature on the prevailing historical patterns of political, social and 
economic integration for immigrants, I will be analyzing whether or not and why these 
patterns are different for Yemeni immigrants and among Yemenis themselves, and if so, 
what factors account for these difference.   
The immigrant integration model is based on the studies of J.W. Berry’s theory of 
integration, which states that “if immigrants wish to maintain their original cultural 
identity and are interested in interacting with host community members at the same time, 
the resulting acculturation strategy is integration”(Berry, 1974, p. 80, See Figure 1).  The 
ways in which immigrants search to find their place in a `new' society have been 
classified by Berry in a clear schema which has been used by many scholars in the field 
of cultural intergroup relationships. I am utilizing the concept of integration as it differs 
from assimilation.  Berry (1990, 2001) and some other migration theorists (Grillo, 1998; 
Faist, 2000; and Nauck, 2001, p. 26 of Remennick, 2003) describe assimilation as the 
total and irreversible dissolution of the minority group into the majority.  Integration, on 
the other hand, implies that the minority group preserves its cultural foundation while 
developing further adaptive features of identity, abilities, networks, participation and so 
forth.  In other words, assimilation is a complete transition from an old culture to a new 
one, whereas integration usually emerges in a form of bi (or multi)-culturalism, including 
bilingualism (Remennick, 2003, p. 27).   Integrative strategy implies a dual cultural 
competence, flexibility, and an effective situation switch between the two cultures (Berry, 
1990; Nauck, 2001).  Two elements are crucial for this kind of adaptation of immigrants: 
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the newcomers' need to maintain their original culture and their desire to have 
relationships with members of the dominant group in society (Berry, 1980; Berry, 
Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992, p. 6 in Berry, 1997). The combination of these factors 
results in four adaptive strategies: integration, assimilation, separation and 
marginalization. I will categorize the dominant patterns for Yemeni-Americans as 
contrasted to Lebanese-Americans in order to understand the effects of income 
disparities, culture, and political positions found in theories on immigrant integration, 
which will be reviewed later in this dissertation. 
Operationalizing Integration 
      In order to operationalize and explain integration,  I will be looking at both 
demographic measures which may or may not reflect or impact integration, such as 
income and educational attainment, as well as dimensional and sequential integration 
measures such as residential patterns, civic participation and cultural measures such as 
norms/values, language use, exogamy, and socialization patterns.  Thus, with integration 
being the best form of immigrant assimilation into the host society, I am utilizing the 
following classification by Berry to predict that Lebanese immigrants would fit into the 
integrated or assimilated categories, while Yemeni immigrants would likely fit into the 
marginalized category. 
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Figure 1. Berry’s four-fold classification model 
 
 Is it considered to be of value to maintain cultural identity 
and characteristics? 
                      YES                                              NO 
Is it considered to be of value to 
maintain relationships with 
other groups?                                   
      YES  
                                                 
                                                NO    
 
Integration 
 
Assimilation 
 
Separation 
 
Marginalization 
 
      
The concept of integration is problematic. In the immigration/incorporation 
discourse integration has quite often been understood as an individual property.  This 
approach has been popularized by social psychologists (among others, John Berry) that 
have operationalized integration in terms of participation in mainstream society in the 
public (economic, political, educational) sphere but maintaining traditional language and 
values in the private sphere. (As we have seen other acculturative options or strategies 
according to this theory are assimilation, separation and marginalization). For example, 
integration = [home/family life separation] culture of origin + [public life assimilation] 
culture of settlement.  Integration as a functional specialization is probably the most 
realistic option for millions of immigrants, sojourners, and other people participating in 
intercultural exchanges. It is much easier to have one culture dominant in one life domain 
and the other culture dominant in remaining activities, than to assume complete 
biculturalism (Boski, 2006, p. 148). Yemeni-American attitudes toward integration as 
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well as predicted independent variables affecting integration will be obtained from 
demographic studies as well as data retrieved through the DAAS which identify the role 
of social factors such as education, gender, marriage, age, language use, income, 
education, among other demographics, as well as behavioral measures such as contacts 
with the former country of origin.  Additionally, my research will analyze the role of 
economic factors, such as socioeconomic status and its impact on whether Yemeni-
American families participate in political or other community processes.  I will also 
examine other contextual factors, such as the degree of maintained links to the country of 
origin that might accelerate or retard integrative processes. This research is based on a set 
of expectations derived from literature regarding factors accelerating or retarding 
integration (as opposed to assimilation or isolation) as well as my assumptions from the 
Yemeni experience that higher income levels readily translate into, and result from, 
greater levels of integration; whether this impact is a result of greater interaction with 
other communities or higher levels of education or business transactions will be 
determined. 
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Chapter Two 
Review of Literature 
Integration Theory 
 One set of factors potentially affecting integration patterns are the traditions and 
practices immigrants bring with them.  In terms of integration patterns, at one time, 
research showed that immigrants gradually achieve full social and economic integration 
the longer they stay in the country.  Research on previous immigrant generations suggests 
that although they may maintain transnational contact when they first arrive, this contact 
steadily diminishes as they take root in the new country and have increased access to 
local social support (Fong, Cao, & Chen, 2007, p. 6).  In recent years, however, the 
transnational perspective, which emerged as an alternative explanation of the immigrant 
adaptation process and in view of new global communications and travel technology, has 
argued that transnational contacts are widespread among recent immigrants.  As they part 
from the former home society, immigrants might retain or reject past practices, though 
they will likely be influenced by them at least to an extent over the generations (Foner, 
1997, p. 970).   
Literature Findings on Predictions of Integration  
 Depending on which group of migrants one is studying and/or which areas of interest, 
the literature on the determinants of immigrant integration offer a variety of ranges within 
the political, economic and cultural context.  A recent report entitled: "Assimilation 
Tomorrow: How America’s Immigrants Will Integrate by 2030," by demographer Dowell 
Myers (a Professor in the School of Policy, Planning, and Development at the University 
of Southern California) and John Pitkin (President of Analysis and Forecasting, Inc., in 
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Cambridge, Massachusetts) conducted research based on Census data and a large number 
of migrants that arrived in the U.S. during the 1990s. The report found that the key 
indicators of integration included, home ownership, citizenship and income. The majority 
of previous studies on the determinants of immigrant integration has predominantly 
focused on structural (mainly economic and educational) integration and has increasingly 
focused on the second generation (Aparicio 2007; Meurs, Pailhe, and Simon 2006; Portes 
and Hao 2004; Simon 2003, p. 3 of Fokemma & de Haas, 2011).  However, relatively 
less empirical research has focused on the determinants of socio-cultural integration of 
migrants and among recently arrived first-generation (i.e., foreign-born) migrants in 
particular. An improved understanding of the determinants of socio-cultural integration is 
important for our understanding of immigrant integration at large. First of all, structural 
(economic) and socio-cultural integration into mainstream society are often closely 
related and tend to reinforce each other (Dagevos, 2001, p. 287). This is demonstrated by 
immigrant or ethnic minority groups such as the Chinese where economic integration 
goes along with high maintenance of a strong group identity and resistance against 
assimilation (Fokkema & Haas, 2011, p. 3). The other way around, immigrant groups 
may experience “downward” assimilation into the mainstream (native) lower class 
cultures while underachieving in education and in the job market (Portes, 2007, p. 87). 
Micro-empirical research has yielded valuable insights into the importance of human 
capital factors (i.e., education, skills, work experience), as well as age and length of stay 
in the receiving countries, in affecting the integration of immigrants and their children 
(Cheswick & Miller, 2001; Curl & Vermilion, 2003, p. 2). In addition, macro level (i.e., 
social, economic, cultural and political) characteristics of origin societies as well as partly 
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related individual migration motives have been increasingly recognized as important 
determinants of immigrant integration. 
Background on Yemeni and Lebanese Migrants 
      Although this dissertation does not have the required data to critically analyze the 
distinctions of the Yemeni and Lebanese communities within their respected countries of 
origin, in an attempt to consider if those distinctions and perceptions of each other impact 
how they settle and integrate into their host societies, it would be beneficial to gain some 
understanding of those differences to explore the ethnicity component in this dissertation. 
In comparison to other Arab groups, Yemeni culture at least in the Middle East, 
seemingly has not been drastically altered in adapting to westernization and 
globalization.  Being that the Yemeni community is primarily a tribal society, with the 
exception of Aden, local connections and local identities remain key to a Yemenis’ 
political and social orientation.  In Yemen, “the lack of financial and technical 
wherewithal to deliver essential services to more than 18 million people scattered over a 
vast terrain perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty" (Carapico, 2007, p. 188).  Private 
investment capital remains scanty, sacred, and small scale, while the terms of structural 
adjustment have raised the costs of investment and reduced the level of consumption” 
(Carapico, 2007, p. 188). 
Furthermore, the former South Yemen had a history of British occupation (in the 
port city of Aden), an envied location on the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea which 
allowed for heavy trading with East Asia and Africa, and finally, a Marxist government 
which unified gender roles economically, politically and socially.  On the other hand, 
former North Yemen has consisted of primarily a tribal, agrarian society isolated from the 
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world and even its neighbor to the south. Throughout much of Yemen, dress, food and 
socialization are closely associated within tribal circles, with Aden, a former British 
colony in the south being the exception.  Aden’s geographically strategic advantage in 
being a port and one that was significant on a major trading route has played a 
considerable part in the progression of its population, which has factored into creating a 
more cosmopolitan society as opposed to the enclosed North.  In fact, southern Yemen as 
a whole had a vastly different political history than northern Yemen 
Unlike many other parts of the country, throughout its history as an international 
port, Aden has been part of regional, intercontinental and global movements of people 
and commodities; this position was further strengthened during the late 1950s – in the 
height of colonial times – when Aden became the third busiest port in the world 
(Dahlgren, 2008, p. 201). Although both regions experienced the relationship between 
colonialism and Islam, the distinction of southern Yemen’s past as a British colony 
followed by its Marxist revolution pertain to expectations about immigrant integration.  
To elaborate, during the period between the British withdrawal from South Yemen in 
1967 and Yemeni unification in 1990, South Yemen had adopted a “scientific socialism” 
(Moline, 1998, p. 94). Their rules on family law explicitly called for the equality of men 
and women; polygamy became prohibited along with unilateral divorce by males. 
Divorce proceedings only took place within courts of civil law (Moline, 1998, p. 94). 
Also in contrast to Northern Yemen, immigrants to the U.S. with urban backgrounds 
came exclusively from Aden migrating in smaller numbers with higher levels of 
education and skills (Abraham, 1977, p. 117).  Further, in terms of where these Yemeni 
immigrants settled within Michigan, Adenis tended to avoid the ghetto-like residential 
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concentrations of their rural countrymen in favor of residential dispersion throughout 
low- and middle-income suburbs within the downriver Michigan region [not Dearborn 
and Hamtramck] (Abraham, 1977, p. 118).  
Distinctions among the Lebanese Immigrant Community 
      In the case of Lebanese immigrants, while initial groups, both Muslim and 
Christian, came to the Southeast Michigan region and beyond in the U.S. for jobs and 
family reunion, major disruptive events occurred over the period 1975 to 1990 and drove 
a renewed immigrant wave: civil war, Arab-Israeli conflicts in Lebanon, Israeli invasions 
of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, war against Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon, inter- 
and intra-communal wars, etc.  All these factors combined to create internal displacement 
of people, disruption of economic activities and insecurity; as a result, a large number of 
people emigrated from Lebanon drawn from all communities and from different 
economic occupations (Tabard, 2009, p. 8).  Thus, beginning in 1975 and continuing until 
1991, a period in which one third of Lebanon’s population emigrated, Lebanese Shi’a 
displaced by their country’s civil war arrived in Dearborn and settled in large numbers 
both in the South end area and in East Dearborn, around Warren Street, while Christian 
refugees from this period tended, like the Palestinian Christians, to settle to the west, in 
Farmington Hills, Westland, and Livonia’ (Belton, 2003). 
The residential patterns of the Lebanese in Metro Detroit can be noticeably 
distinguished on the basis of religion and scale of residential concentration, with the 
Muslims densely populating a western suburb and the Lebanese Christians widely 
dispersed over a number of eastern suburbs (Abraham & Shryock, 2000, p. 518). Splits 
within the diverse Arab-American community also shape life in Dearborn, though these 
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divisions are not those of Middle East antagonisms rewritten in concentrated form on the 
layout of Dearborn (Abraham, 2000, p. 53).   The devastating conclusion of Lebanon’s 
civil war in the late '80s with harsh intra-Christian and intra-Muslim fighting created a 
large wave of emigrants, especially Christians giving up on the future of Lebanon. 
Moreover, the post-war exodus, with the increasing departure of Christian (especially 
Marinate) communities, has fragmented the Lebanese Diaspora into communalism, 
which in turn assumes the form of ethnicities in the host society (Humphrey, 2004, p. 14).   
Additionally, "Lebanon has been one of the most troubled sites for sectarian 
divisions in the Arab world, but sectarianism never really took hold in southeast 
Michigan with the same virulence it did in Lebanon during the civil war" (Signal, 1997, 
website). Though relations between Christians and Muslims ebbed and flowed with the 
various stages of the war in Lebanon, most of those who escaped the war tried actively to 
leave behind the political and communal differences that had caused so much turmoil. 
Taking up residence in a foreign society known for its upward mobility opportunities, and 
worries about how Arabs might be treated in a non-Arab society, often allows previously 
warring factions at least to set aside their differences in the new land.  
Rather, "clearer divisions in the Arab American community exist along class lines 
and degrees of cultural assimilation" (Signal, 1997, website).  Indeed there are marked 
differences of economic attainment between Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants. For 
instance, according to a study by Kristine Ajrouch and Amaney Jamal, 
“Lebanese/Syrians were more likely to identify as white compared to Yemenis and Iraqis 
(Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007, p. 873).   They went on to note that “the Lebanese/Syrians were 
historically instrumental in securing a white identity for themselves as they gained 
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economic success in the New World" (Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007, p. 873).  Having achieved 
a white identity that coincides with those economic interests and one that does not 
conflict with their phenotype nor political identities in the region, it may be that 
Lebanese/Syrians are less likely to perceive themselves as a minority compared to Iraqis 
and Yemeni participants (Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007, p. 873).  In sum, such concepts of 
identity would seem to denote an essential part of social life, specifically for immigrant 
groups, pointing to a focal element of incorporation to the host country and a take off 
point from which they might launch their political participation.   
  Further, although this study will not delve into an analysis of urban versus rural 
differences in its impact on immigrant integration, an understanding of the distinctions 
among these communities as illustrated below, would be useful in furthering this research 
in the future.  Thus, in analyzing the role of urban versus rural backgrounds in levels of 
immigrant integration, due to distinct differences in their geographical, economic, 
historical, cultural, and political backgrounds, northern Yemeni-Americans and southern 
Yemeni-Americans have assimilated at varying degrees into U.S. society, with first 
generation southern Yemeni-Americans reportedly being more open to integration than 
their more rural and traditional first generation northern counterparts  (Abraham, 1977, p. 
116).  Immigrants with urban backgrounds come exclusively from the South Yemeni city 
of Aden, while Lebanese with urban experience come mainly from Beirut but also from 
some other significant towns (Abraham, 1977, p. 116).  Additionally, in comparison to 
their northern Yemeni counterparts who consist of a rural origin coming from middle and 
small land-owning peasant families, Adenis are a relatively smaller group and had 
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worked as skilled laborers, technicians, merchants, teachers, and government 
functionaries (Abraham, 1977, p. 117).   
In comparison, as previously noted, the residential patterns of Lebanese-
Americans, as in Lebanon, were clearly demarcated on the basis of religion and degree of 
residential concentration, with the Muslims densely populating a western suburb and the 
Lebanese Christians widely dispersed over a number of eastern suburbs (Abraham, 1977, 
p. 97), Yemeni immigrants, at least in their initial phases and to a large extent since, 
tended to reside near their place of employment, allowing them to walk to work.  For 
example, the two residential settlements of Michigan that account for the bulk of the 
Yemeni population are the Southend in Dearborn located around the Ford River Rouge 
Complex and the Chrysler Eldon Avenue Complex located in Hamtramck (Abraham, 
1977, p. 97).  
The dynamics of ethnic relations also are significant to an understanding of these 
immigrant communities. The earliest immigrants arriving from Lebanon settled into 
patterns to which subsequent immigrants essentially adjusted. Lebanon, like northern 
Yemen, is a mountainous area with significant geo-cultural north-south distinctions, and 
geography has a strong influence on culture. The Lebanese state has always been weak, 
while religious, kinship and regional groups have had significant sovereignty; sometimes 
they coexist, sometimes they are in conflict. But these religio-ethnic groups have had 
general territorial bases and although many of their members have migrated to cities such 
as Beirut, they have a general territorial base in the cities as well (Salloum, 2002). The 
groups are decidedly endogamous, meaning there is great pressure to marry within the 
group, which in turn, affects the shared dynamics of the group because those who try to 
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marry outside, most specifically women, may have to endure negative effects. The highly 
endogamous and somewhat stratified religious ethnic groups of Lebanon created some of 
the settlement patterns and the interaction patterns for groups in the U.S. (Salloum, 
2002). The pattern of immigration is similarly imperative. For example, according to 
Salloum, Lebanese immigrants formed large communities, which gave relatives a place 
to come (Salloum, 2002). Additionally, in 1982, during the war in which Israel attacked 
Beirut and invaded south Lebanon, large numbers of immigrants arrived in the 
established Dearborn area kinship communities (Salloum, 2002). 
In terms of a comparison among the Lebanese and Yemeni-American diasporas, 
Lebanese communities tended to form enclaves or, if scattered in residential patterns to 
form civic associations linked to their home areas, such as Bint Jubail and Tibnine, with 
thousands of members often residing in close proximity in the Detroit area, while 
Yemenis came in a pattern termed “recurrent” migration, meaning they come for a few 
years, go back to Yemen, then come again (Salloum, 2002). Further, in contrast to 
Lebanese family migrations, many of the Yemeni immigrants have been single men. 
By the 1920s, when Ford built his auto plants in the city, the good salaries offered 
to prospective employees enticed a large number of Syrian-Lebanese and later Yemenis 
to his plants in the Detroit suburb of Highland Park and later to southeast Dearborn 
(Salloum, 2002). According to Patrick Belton, ‘unaccompanied Yemeni males had been 
migrating to Dearborn since the beginning of Arab immigration, but in the mid-1970s 
they began to arrive in larger numbers’ (Belton, 2003). Less educated and less fluent in 
English than other Muslim immigrants, including Lebanese, these Yemeni migrants 
tended to hold unskilled positions in Dearborn and send remittances to their families in 
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Yemen. Rather than bring their families to Dearborn, they themselves returned to 
Yemen–recurrently and, with time, many returned permanently.  More strictly religious 
than many of the other groups, the Yemenis tend to reject what they regard as the 
corruptive pressures of American society. "They concentrated in the South end of 
Dearborn with other Yemenis, with the result that the neighborhood now shows the 
influence of the Yemeni countryside in dress, its absence of women from public spaces, 
and the centering of male social life around the neighborhood’s coffeehouses" (Belton, 
2003). 
In the literature, return migration or repatriation is often used as an indicator of 
sojourning or lack of commitment to the host country, but data for this measure are rarely 
accessible (Archdeacon, Bodnar, and Caroli, in Yang 1999, p. 64). Clearly, sojourners 
tend to retain home-country allegiance, to rent homes, and to return to the country of 
origin one day. In contrast, settlers are inclined to become citizens of the adopted 
country, to purchase their own houses, and to stay there for the rest of their lives.  Thus, 
the Yemeni-American first generation immigrant patterns are seemingly quite similar to 
the settler versus sojourner patterns in immigration.   
Such an area of research is significant in that there has been less effort to 
understand the patterns and problems regarding immigrant integration of more socially 
isolated immigrant groups, such as Yemeni immigrants as compared with other Arab and 
non-Arab immigrants.  Yemen has a history of creating an identity wherein it intended to 
set itself apart from its Arab neighbors [this pattern may have carried over to Yemeni 
expatriate communities as well].  To elaborate, Yemeni nationalism was distinct from the 
rest of the Arab world in the fact that it positioned itself as being part of the Arab world 
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but also in opposition to other Arab states and peoples.  According to Fred Halliday, two 
significant factors played a role in this identity:  (1) Yemeni nationalism embraced the 
country’s pre-Islamic civilizations, much unlike its neighboring Arab countries in the 
Gulf, though not unlike Egypt (Halliday, 1997, p 34). What other Muslim countries have 
deemed a time of “ignorance,” Yemen has highlighted its pre-Islamic history as an 
example of the contrasts that took place between what was happening in Yemen and what 
was taking place elsewhere in the less settled areas of the Arabian Peninsula; (2) Yemeni 
nationalism was not only directed against British and Ottoman colonialism, but it has also 
been directed against Saudi Arabia and its treatment of Yemenis beginning in the 1920s 
and early 30s during the oil boom and the ongoing political, including border, disputes 
between the two states (Halliday, 1997, p. 35). This sense of contrast with other Arab 
states was further compounded by the experience of the Egyptian military presence in 
Yemen during the 1960s (Halliday, 1997, pp. 34-5).  
      Whether such a background for immigrants from this region has any substantial 
and lingering effects on Yemeni-American integration is still unknown. However, there 
has been some literature on the Yemeni immigrant community that connects Yemenis 
who reside in Yemen and those who emigrate.  For instance, it may be important to note 
that Yemenis are, for the most part, racially and ethnically homogeneous (Held & 
Cummings 1989, p. 155).  This ethnic homogeneity has enabled the Yemenis in diaspora 
to preserve their identity as an ethnic community rather than a religious one (Warner and 
Wittner, 1998, p. 247). This is understandable, since ethno-linguistic differentiations that 
characterize other communities do not exist among Yemenis; as Carla Makhlouf 
discovered, although the study was an examination of Northern Yemeni society within 
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Yemen, “Yemenis have little interaction with non-Yemenis and for political, economic, 
and religious reasons, Yemen has been historically a most isolated society” (Makhlouf, 
1979, p. 14).  
Nevertheless, information is needed on patterns of successful immigrant 
integration, such as the factors that impact integration and the services used or needed by 
immigrants to facilitate the process.  Contrasting Yemeni with the Lebanese diaspora, one 
notes the Lebanese division by clans and sects within Islam as well as Muslim-Christian 
divides. When they first began inhabiting the Dearborn area, Christian immigrants from 
present-day Lebanon settled in the eastern parts of the city, while the Lebanese Shi’a 
Muslims settled closer to Ford Motor Company areas of the city, being that a great 
majority of them worked for the auto manufacturer (Haddad & Smith 1994, p. 126).  
Furthermore, in terms of these immigrant groups choosing particular occupations, such as 
commercial and merchant enterprises, which in turn allowed them to interact with other 
groups, the Lebanese immigrants were found to be closely similar to Palestinian-
Jordanian and Syrian immigrant groups, whereby approximately one-fourth of the 
community now hold managerial and professional occupations while another one-fourth 
work in industrial and construction jobs, either in the skilled trades or in semi-skilled 
functions (Abraham &  Shryock, 2000, p. 84).  In contrast, the Yemenis remain heavily 
concentrated in the manufacturing industry, predominately in the lesser-skilled 
occupations rather than the trades and overrepresented in service occupations, largely 
food preparation in eating and drinking establishments (Abraham & Shryock, 2000, p. 
84). 
30 
 
 
Within immigrant communities, individuals presumably make choices about the 
degree to which they can accept or participate in the host society’s culture; and thus, we 
need to know more about the circumstances of such choices as well as the challenges to 
integration that, if understood and overcome, could benefit the society as a whole. 
Learning more, particularly in a comparative cross-national context, about the processes 
and conditions of immigrant absorption and integration will allow for more enlightened 
public policies relating to health care, housing, employment and educational issues in 
host countries.  Good immigration policies permit the shift from the impending economic 
and social prospect of immigration to recognizing tangible economic and social benefits 
for the country. 
Additionally significant, early Yemeni immigrants, from the 1960s through the 
70s, can be distinguished from their Arab immigrant counterparts by the fact that they 
came to the U.S. mostly without their families and made periodic trips back to Yemen 
which strengthened their ties to their home country.  Thus, the net result of these 
distinguishing characteristics is that Yemenis to a greater degree than any other single 
Arab group expected to attain social mobility and gratification in their native country, and 
not so much in the U.S. (Abraham, 1977, p. 4) As stated by Georgory Orfalea, “there 
really is no Arab group comparable to the Yemenis, 90 percent of whom were 
unaccompanied young males, semi-literate or illiterate; with little knowledge of English 
most have not taken root here and shuttle back and forth on jumbo planes to Yemen, 
buying homes and land back there (Orfalea, 1988, p.181).  
It should be noted, however, that Orfalea wrote his book in 1988 when the 
majority of Yemeni immigrants were male.  For Lebanese immigrants, young men also 
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were the first to emigrate followed by young women and later wives and entire families, 
however, this was only the case with the earliest immigrants from Lebanon (Hajar & 
Jones, 2000). During the 1990s, an increasing number of Yemeni families also 
immigrated to the U.S. either accompanying their husbands, fathers or brothers or 
following them after the men had settled with employment and housing.  Further, it is 
possible that immigration was no longer considered as short-term, which could be a result 
of the worsening economic and political status of Yemen which experienced severe 
economic issues with the unification of the country followed by a civil war in 1994.   
Nonetheless, immigrant families often experience generational conflict between 
adults who want their children to practice traditional ways and the young who are eager 
to join the mainstream by casting off what they see as archaic habits and customs 
(Ajrouch, 2000, p. 449). What may be found to be unique among the Yemeni community, 
being that many of the immigrants were considered as initially sojourner status, is that 
persons of later generations (i.e., second, third, or later) reported significantly greater 
adoption of American cultural practices compared to sojourners and immigrants (Amer, 
2005, p. 173).  
  Further, although the data is not ample enough to show for variations in the 
patterns of residence among the two communities and its impact on their integration 
levels, it is useful to understand some of the distinctions of how these groups have 
settled.  This background if utilized in future studies, may or may not be significant in 
verifying patterns of integration, however for this dissertation, there may be a connection 
in the cultural integration aspect between their territorial settlement based on religion (for 
Lebanese), kinship and geography and their levels of cultural integration, which include:  
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their strength of ties to their country or origin; language usage; marriage to someone of 
Arab background; and frequency of return visits. 
Thus, the literature reveals that Yemeni immigration patterns have differed from 
the Lebanese in that Lebanese immigrants are mostly highly educated and thus, they have 
a tendency to detach themselves from other immigrant groups by accentuating their 
similarities to the mainstream, quite unlike the Yemeni community.  However, this leaves 
us with unanswered questions regarding the evolution of immigrant integration involving 
these groups over time. Therefore, there is reason to consider whether the pattern of 
Yemeni non-integration has changed to correspond more to other Arab cultural groups 
and families.  For future research, I am interested in exploring the connections between 
the economic and political conditions in the country of origin, Yemen, and the patterns of 
integration for first and second generation Yemeni-Americans.  In other words, what is 
the impact, if any, of Yemen’s political and socioeconomic status on whether or not these 
first generation Yemeni-Americans choose to settle permanently in the U.S. or have 
intentions of a temporary stay and an eventual return to Yemen? A similar line in inquiry 
can look for effects of Lebanon’s periodic upheavals and warfare on immigrant 
integration patterns abroad.  However, based on the current availability of data on these 
two communities, the following literature research for this current study will consider 
why some groups within a nominal culture (Yemenis and Lebanese) integrate into new 
host societies after immigration more rapidly than others.  Thus, it will be an analysis on 
the correlation between the slower rates of immigrant integration, especially participatory 
political integration, among Yemeni-Americans and its connections to the economic and 
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cultural conditions within this community, with a comparative analysis of Lebanese-
Americans.   
Relevant Literature for Ethnicty and Political Participation  
 What is ethnicity and how and why does it matter for political participation?  
Previous research has shown that the participatory discrepancy of Asian-Americans for 
instance cannot be explained with socio-demographic and group perception variables.  
Assuming the analysis of an emergent list of scholars who consider ethnicity as a 
developing trend, my study offers multidimensional measures of ethnicity for two 
immigrant groups from similar and dissimilar backgrounds. The prevailing literature 
ranging from studies of differences among Anglo- 
Whites, African-Americans, and Latino voting turnout and other electoral or non-
electoral behaviors often emphasizes the defining impact of socioeconomic status (SES), 
especially education (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Nie et al., 
1988; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Conway, 1991; Verba et al., 1991). In studies conducted 
on blacks, Mexican-Americans, and whites in Austin, Texas, ethnicity proved important 
in distinguishing levels of voluntary association membership, a significant variable used 
in DAAS and utilized in my political activism component (Williams, Babchuk, and 
Johnson, 1973, p. 637).  Further, in studies using ethnicity as the key dependent variable, 
when used in conjunction with socioeconomic status and age, they can explain 
differences in political participation (Antunes & Gaitz, 1975, p. 1198). 
Both the practical and the theoretical perspectives motivate the following 
questions: First, do the members of the different groups, Yemeni and Lebanese, differ in 
the amount and type of their participatory activity? Second, do any differences that are 
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found reflect ethnicity directly, or are they an indirect product of ethnicity (perhaps 
through group-based mobilization), [or the effect of differences on Berry’s scales] or are 
they simply the result of a random correlation between ethnicity and other factors (such 
as socioeconomic characteristics)? Third, how much activity might one expect to see in 
the future under different scenarios of demographic and political change?  In which ways 
does ethnicity influence political participation at the individual level?   
In exploring the literature, several authors have identified ethnicity as an 
important source of political participation.  Further, ethnicity is often shown to have a 
greater effect than socioeconomic status on levels of participant political culture (Nelson, 
1979, p. 1024).  As we will see in my analysis, however, this finding is antithetical to my 
findings on the analysis of Yemeni and Lebanese-American groups from the DAAS.  
Among the best-known works on the subject are those of Greeley (1974) and Wilson and 
Banfield (1965, 1971). Using Verba's and Nie's data, Greeley maintains that ethnicity is 
"a meaningful predictor of political participation in American society" and that "its 
impact does not go away when social class is held constant" (Greeley, 1974, p. 170). In 
other words, it is resources (or social capital), not race or ethnicity, that determine who 
takes part in American political life. Having located the basis of variations in political 
activity among Latinos, African-Americans and Anglo-Whites in disparities in their 
politically pertinent resources, Verba, Schlotzman, Brady and Nie note that race and 
ethnicity matter essentially for participation in two different ways in the fact that 
language and religious denomination and practice - are intimately connected to group 
identity (Verba, Schlotzman, Brady & Nie, 1995, p. 494). Further, the authors found that 
differences in education, income and occupation associated with race and ethnicity that 
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help to account for participatory differences do not define an ethnic group, while religion 
and language, however, are social characteristics that go to the heart of the meaning of 
ethnicity (Verba, Schlotzman, Brady and Nie, 1995, p. 494). Finally, Berry’s theory of 
integration affirms that ethnicity matters in that, in an effort to integrate, immigrants 
would retain their culture of origin while adapting to the new culture. Thus "identity 
would consist of the equivalent concept of having a bicultural or integrated identity: 
feeling that one is both part of an ethnic group and part of the larger society, which in 
turn would directly result in further integration" (Berry & Sam, 1997, p. 317). 
Ethnicity in terms of immigrant research is a broad topic covering several issues, 
such as transationalism and factors within the immigrants’ home countries that may range 
from socio-economic status to geography to history to population settings.  I have found 
that the literature on the topic of Yemeni-Americans in any respect is extremely sparse.  
In regards to the literature found under the topic of assimilation and transnationalism, 
there is some relevant material to be found. However, the material only explains the 
cultural background of Yemenis and Yemeni-Americans and the geographical, economic, 
historical, and political factors which have led to their emigration to the U.S.  Further, the 
literature found does offer insights as to why Yemeni-Americans are considered to be so 
resistant to assimilation into mainstream American society.  Nonetheless, in identifying 
what the literature lacks, in terms of my research question, no empirical research has yet 
been done on the more recent generations of Yemeni-Americans and whether or not this 
community’s stance of assimilation has changed. Although the DAAS does not delve 
deeply into analysis of transnational issues, some of the survey questions given, which I 
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have utilized in my Arab Cultural Index, will shed some light on Yemeni levels of 
transnationalism as compared to Lebanese levels. 
Transnationalism  
      Some research on transnationalism will be important in the analysis of Yemeni-
Americans and their emigration and degrees of assimilation in an effort to distinguish the 
elements which familiarize these migrants with their newer society and their possibly 
altered feelings toward their country of origin (Portes 1999, Faist 2000a; Faist 2000b). 
Transnationalism is a "global phenomenon". It takes into account the context of 
globalization and economic uncertainty that facilitates the construction of world-wide 
networks. Its institutionalization requires a coordination of activities based most of the 
time on common references - objective or subjective - and common interest among 
members; a coordination of resources, information, technology and sites of social power 
across national borders for political, cultural, economic purposes. “Transnationalization 
has far-reaching consequences in how we think about immigrant adaptation, global civil 
society, communities, culture, and citizenship” (Faist, 2000, p. 190).  Furthermore, as 
nations are increasingly penetrated by global forces, losing their autonomy if not their 
sovereignty, the initiative in world politics has arguably passed to ‘epistemic 
communities’ defined by ‘common worldviews, purposes, interests and praxis’ (Rudolph 
and Piscatori, 1997, p. 2).  
A host of studies demonstrate how mobilization by immigrants or minorities has 
tipped the balance in favor of the country of origin from the platform of a diaspora’s host 
country (Ellis & Kahn, 1998, p. 473).  At the grass-roots level, economic 
transnationalism offers an alternative to some immigrants and their home country 
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counterparts against low-wage dead-end jobs; political transnationalism gives them voice 
that they otherwise would not have; and cultural transnationalism allows them to reaffirm 
their own self-worth and transmit valued traditions to their young (Portes, 1999, p. 469). 
Further, “transnational ties cut through these factors and make migrants as engaged in 
homeland politics as refugees, settled migrants as active as newly arrived, and well-
integrated migrants as active as those with a weaker foothold in the new country of 
settlement” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003, p. 760-786). Based on Berry’s conception of 
integration however, such forms of acculturation run negatively against the successful 
integration of immigrants into the host society, being that full integration cannot not be 
made as transnationalism favors connection to the country of origin rather than having 
the recognition and acceptance of a multicultural society.  To Berry, integrated 
individuals are individuals who want to maintain their identity with home culture, but 
also want to take on some characteristics of the new culture.  
Many Yemeni- and Lebanese-American families maneuver in a well-established 
transnational social field, with citizenship rights, property, ongoing economic activities, 
thick kinship ties, and family practices that link their daily life here with relationships and 
activities in Yemen or Lebanon.  Hermans and Kempen have called for alternative ways 
of thinking about immigrant identity (Hermans & Kempen, 1998, p. 1117). They argue 
that in a period of increasing globalization, the rapid creation of multinational citizens, 
the formation of diasporic communities, massive flows of transmigration and border 
crossings, acculturation becomes increasingly complicated (Hermans & Kempen, 1998, 
p. 1117).  Rather than thinking of immigrants as moving in a linear trajectory from 
culture A to culture B, Hermans and Kempen suggest that we should think of 
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acculturation and identity issues as ‘mixing and moving’ (Hermans & Kempen, 1998, p. 
1117).   
In comparison, just as the Yemeni-American immigrants, Lebanese immigrants 
most often consist of an extended family that constitutes the fundamental foundation of 
Lebanese society and provides the key support to which family members turn in times of 
need.  ‘The extended family is the main source of networks for social, economic, and 
political survival of the individual and the clan, and, consequently, of Lebanon’ (Joseph, 
1993, pp. 478-479).  These networks were and continue to be vital in linking Lebanese 
residents with their transnational emigrants and vice versa by helping in sponsoring new 
emigrants and in facilitating their lives in the receiving countries. However, just as with 
the Yemeni immigrant case, the most valuable tangible output of these networks is the 
immense monetary transfer that the emigrants send back to their families in Lebanon 
(Hourani, 2007, p. 5).  
 For some, immigrants’ ties to the country of origin might diminish their political 
interest and participation in the new state, but the literature seems to indicate a greater 
likelihood that ties and participation abroad would spur greater participation in the U.S. 
as well, in defending ethnic and group interests and perceived welfare. However, the 
implications of this viewpoint for Berry’s model, is that such a result is possible, yet 
ideally the most successful form of immigrant integration into the host society would 
involve participation in both the receiving society’s culture as well as the culture of origin 
in a proportional manner. However, one could also assume that migrants’ continuing 
transnational involvement goes hand in hand with integration (Berry & Sam, 1996, p. 
19). 
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Transnational practices take the form of remittances to relatives remaining in the 
home country, of repeated trips to the country of origin, or of sending one’s children to 
schools or after school programs established and run by immigrants with the explicit 
purpose of maintaining the real or assumed original culture of the migrants. These are 
social practices that create or maintain links between former identities and new societies 
among immigrants and their descendants. In this way, we see the formation of 
transnational ethnic worlds (Werbner, 1999, p. 17), transnational social fields (Guarnizo 
& Smith, 1998), or transnational social spaces (Faist, 1999, p. 2). By engaging in 
transnational practices ethnic minorities often distinguish themselves from the majority 
population.  In short, ‘transnationalism’ covers a social context or a network dominated 
by practices which connect two or more national contexts, with the effect that an 
ambivalent relationship to both the former home country and the current host country 
may arise (Rudolph & Piscatori, 1997, p. 471 and, p. 463). 
Political Participation and Integration 
Political participation is seen as a function of ethnic differences, cultural, and 
economic integration.  The impact of ethnicity on political participation was chosen 
because participation is a very broad domain that includes not only socio-economic and 
political participation but also access to culture. Various studies found numerous 
circumstances and conditions which affected the political participation of immigrant 
groups.  However, most have emphasized the importance of socioeconomic status in 
developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation. 
Below, I will be further organizing the literature and study methodology 
according to three main predictors:  1) Yemeni- versus- Lebanese comparison:  To 
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consider whether or not there are ethnicity differences between Yemeni and Lebanese 
immigrants in determining levels of political participation;  2)  Cultural Integration:  To 
consider whether and if so how, cultural integration, meaning how immigrants come to 
obtain membership the host society which would include social interactions (frequency of 
contacts within host country and in comparison to country of origin), friendships, 
rules/norms behavior, marriages, voluntary associations, language usage and proficiency 
(specifically of English in the US), permanent status in the host country, and 
intermarriages affects political participation and test how differences in cultural 
integration between the Lebanese and Yemeni immigrant communities account for  any 
observed ethnic differences in political participation; and  3) To consider the role of 
economic integration (socioeconomic status) on political participation in these two 
communities. 
 It is essential to understand what is meant by and what accounts for political 
participation, including its foundations in past and present research.  Customary accounts 
of political participation usually concentrated on the individual characteristics that 
differentiate participants from non-participants, for instance through ranks of income 
levels and degrees of education. Martiniello understands political participation as “the 
active dimension of citizenship” (Martiniello, 2005, p. 5).  In his interpretation, it relates 
to the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of the collective 
affairs of a given political community and comprises “less conventional types of political 
activities such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, boycotts, etc.” 
(Martiniello, 2005, p. 5).  
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Some authors in the literature go further is explicating exactly what they define as 
activities that are incorporated as political participation.  For instance, Verba and Nie 
exclude from their understanding of political participation the following:  1) ceremonial 
or support participation (because they are not aimed at influencing political decisions); 2) 
attitudes (evidently not predictably associated with action); 3) participation in schools, 
family, jobs, voluntary associations etc., whereby only “legal and legitimate” modes are 
considered, excluding most forms of political protest (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 23).  
Further, in a comparable way Parry et al. overtly indicated what they do not include in 
their conceptualization of political participation:  1) behavior not aimed at influencing 
public representatives (e.g., going to an office to receive welfare benefits); 2) 
participation in the workplace; 3) show of interest in politics; 4) display of attitudes to 
support the functioning of democracy; and 5) readiness or willingness to take action 
(Verba & Nie 1972, Parry, Moyser & Day 1992, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).    
The traditional definition of political participation involves a range of essential activities 
actually carried out by individuals outside of their employment remit, the intention of 
which is to sway a political decision (Verba & Nie 1972, Parry, Moyser & Day 1992, 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  The last point has been gradually extended to 
include activities such as protests (viz., Occupy Wall Street), which on occasion attempt 
to influence political opinion rather than decisions taken by government agents, or such 
as political consumption aimed at company activities (Anduiza,  Cantijoch,  & Gallego,  
2009, p. 884).   
In political integration, it may be significant to distinguish between local versus 
national versus international political participation of the immigrant groups.  One area of 
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this dissertation will consider whether there is more or less local and national political 
participation among Yemeni- and Lebanese-Americans.  Steven Rosenstone and John 
Hansen argued that ‘involvement in organizations promotes political participation by 
making people susceptible to mobilization whereby, politically, organizations stand 
between national and local political leaders and ordinary citizens’ (Rosenstone & Hansen, 
1993, p. 87).  
For many Arab-Americans, the Arab-Israeli War also denoted the establishment 
of their social, political and cultural marginalization. The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 
specifically instigated the shift towards a rising ethno-political consciousness among 
members of the Arab-American community (Abraham 1989; Suleiman and Abu-Laban 
1989). Not only did the war signify the U.S.’s confirmed alliance with Israel, but it gave 
Arab-Americans their first taste of exclusion from a role in the political process 
(Suleiman, 1989, p. 13). This period also entailed the beginning of a war, waged by the 
U.S. media, against Arabs at home and in the Diaspora which has distorted the meaning 
of the term Arab and further complicated Arab-American identity (Naber, 2000, p. 41). 
However, some current research has shown that the effects of the September 11th 
backlash against the Arab and Muslim communities, has triggered a resurgence of 
political participation among the communities.  The horrific events of September 11th, 
2001 broadened Arab-American political influence beyond traditional areas of Arab- 
American settlement, but also within them. “New Arab-Americans were mobilized as 
part of the broader Arab-American voting public in the suburban and ex-urban locations 
we studied, but Arab-Americans gained voting power relative to the general population in 
the largest cities” (Gimpel, 2007, p.347). 
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Thus, when analyzing the levels of political participation among Yemeni and 
Lebanese immigrants, one must not only consider those that are actively involved in 
political organizations but also the role of foreign policy and how it is played out within 
the mass media in terms of its effects on how politically active these immigrants become 
and in which ways.  The majority of recent Lebanese immigrants arrived in the U.S. after 
the 1980s as a direct consequence of the political crisis in Lebanon.  Further, the 
Lebanese civil war between 1975 and 1990 displaced many people around the world and 
forced them to seek refuge in countries like the United States and Canada (Stephan, 2009, 
pp. 148-9). These immigrants were not necessarily motivated “by political choice but 
simply because there is nowhere else to go” (Christison, 1989, 111). The continuous 
political instability and economic hardship in Lebanon are responsible for the continuous 
Lebanese immigration to the United States and elsewhere despite the mistreatment of 
post 9-11 immigrants in these host countries (Martin, 2004). 
Political Activism 
Political Activism varies in much of the literature.  Each study uses different 
variations of what they would consider as the factors which make up political activism, 
sometimes including activism both in the new host and old home country.  For instance, 
Guarnizo’s 2002 study on transnationalism, utilized the following factors: member of 
home country political party; give money to home country political party; take part in 
home country political campaigns/rallies (Guarnizo, 2002, p. 286).  Also, other studies 
have gone further to include factors such as:  reads newspapers from country of origin, 
keeps in touch with politics in country of origin, member of political party in country of 
origin, participates in demonstrations related to country of origin (Snel, Engbersen and 
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Leerkes, 2006, p. 289).  Additionally, other aspects within the literature which make up 
political activism are:  collections of signatures, complaints to politicians and strikes 
(Berger, Galonska, & Koopsmans, 2004, p. 500).   
In summary, Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller have organized political activism for 
immigrants based on transnational electoral participation which includes membership in a 
political party in the country of origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active 
involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin, followed by transnational non-
electoral politics which includes membership in a hometown civic association, monetary 
contributions to civic projects in the community of origin, and regular membership in 
charity organizations sponsoring projects in the home country (Guarnizo, Portes, & 
Haller, 2003, p. 1223). However, generally much of the literature is in agreement on the 
overall description of political activism to include:  voting, registration to vote, giving 
campaign money, working on campaigns, and protesting in the new host state (Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozman, 1995, p. 156), which is utilized in this dissertation.  Although this 
dissertation will only consider forms of political participation that occur in the host 
country, however, future studies considering migrants’ participation in politics abroad 
would be useful to demonstrate the rebound effects on ones’ participation in the country 
of new residence.   
Measuring Effects on Political Participation 
This dissertation will focus on political participation as a primary outcome (i.e. 
dependent variable). Political participation will be measured using three indicators 
including: 1) self-reported registration to vote, 2) self-reported voting in the 2000 
presidential election, and 3) an index of political activism incorporating the sum total of 
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four self-reported political activities:  signing a petition; contributing money;  
calling/writing a government official; protesting.  Measurement of political integration, 
therefore, will consist of registration to vote and if the immigrant had voted.  Further, a 
political activism model will be created which will consist of:  1) signing a petition; 2) 
contributing money; 3) calling/writing a government official; and 4) protesting.   
I am predicting three main effects on political integration, the main one is through 
ethnicity and cultural characteristics, the other two are cultural integration (cross-cultural 
associations) and economic integration (occupational mixing) in American society; then I 
will conduct multivariate analysis to see if the relationships are affected by the 
confounding factors. Ethnicity will be measured using self-reported country of origin of 
respondents born outside the U.S., or self-reported country of origin of parents and 
grandparents of respondents reporting being born in the U.S.  To this end, paternal 
lineage will be used to classify respondents as Yemenis or Lebanese.  Cultural integration 
is measured using an additive scale of indicators intended to measure respondents’ level 
of acculturation with the host country.  Acculturation is operationalized using three 
domains that include citizenship, identification with Arab culture and Arabic and English 
language usage. Indicators in these three domains are coded so that higher values indicate 
higher levels of U.S cultural integration. Further, economic integration will be measured 
using four indicators of economic achievement including:  home ownership, employment 
status and type, education and income. Lastly, my multivariate models will account for a 
series of factors that have been shown to affect the level of political participation 
including age, respondents’ marital status, gender, party identification, generational 
length of residence in U.S., and ideology which consists of an individual’s political and 
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social outlook ranging from very conservative, moderately conservative, middle-of-the-
road, moderately liberal, or very liberal.  
An important element of the theoretical model is the role that cultural and 
economic integration play in moderating ethnic differences in political participation. Due 
to time and funding constraints, this project will be a purely quantitative study utilizing 
the DAAS data, which is the largest study conducted in Southeast Michigan of Arab- 
Americans. No additional surveys will be attempted.  Political Participation is the 
Dependent Variable.  The study could be considered as “groundbreaking” in that there 
have been no studies exploring in depth the Yemeni community’s political participation 
and more specifically exploring how this community’s levels of acculturation and 
economic achievement (integration vs. biculturalism) affect their political activity in the 
U.S. Further, modeling this work as an intra-Arab comparison (Yemeni/Lebanese), adds 
to the importance. By comparing the Yemeni and the Lebanese community, a much more 
diverse, acculturated [also integrated rather than bicultural in Berry’s terms] and 
economically established segment of the Arab-American community, I intend to bring 
forward these differences and try to explain them.  I believe that there is a definite gap in 
ethno-cultural studies on these two groups, which this work will help to fill with regard to 
intra-ethnic differences in political participation. 
Political Participation and Ethnicity  
Aim 1:  To consider whether or not there are ethnic differences between Yemeni 
and Lebanese immigrants in determining levels of political participation.  
H1:  I propose that Lebanese respondents have higher rates of political participation 
compared to those originating from Yemen.  In working from the assumption that the 
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Lebanese respondents are more integrated then the Yemeni respondents, thus based off of 
Berry's model of integration, the more one is integrated, the more one is likely to 
participate.  This expectation is derived from the theory that integration can be one of the 
linkages between objective group conditions and political action where resources 
accumulated by one's ethnic origin, education, income, and occupation are translated into 
skills and attitudes facilitating involvement in political activities (Pei-te Lien, 1994; 
Berry).  Therefore, ethnicity would have an impact on political participation of ethnic 
groups, in this case favoring the Lebanese group over the Yemenis in terms of higher 
rates of political participation.   
Analytic approach:  First, prevalence rates of voting registration and voting, and mean 
levels of political activism will be calculated to examine and test differences between the 
two ethnic groups.  Additionally, multivariate modeling of the three outcomes of interest 
(Dependent Variables): registration to vote, voting, and political activism will be done. I 
will use logistic regressions in the case of dichotomous measures (i.e. registration to vote 
& voting), and count models (more specifically a model based on a Poisson distribution) 
to account for political activism. My multivariate analysis is aimed to determine whether 
and how the relationship between ethnicity and political participation is moderated by 
confounding factors (i.e. age, marital status, sex, party ideology, and ideology). In the 
next phase of my analysis, I will look at where economic and cultural levels come in.  
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Political Participation and Cultural Integration 
Relevant Literature: 
Cultural integration refers to the cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal changes 
experienced as migrants acquire the core competencies of the host culture and society.2 It 
places the individual's personal identification within the social system and determines 
whether they continue to identify with their native culture or, rather, see themselves as a 
part of the host society (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p. 10).   Just as in Berry’s model, 
this does not necessarily mean that immigrants should choose one culture over the other 
(host culture versus home culture); rather it is a complimentary fusion of the two cultures 
which would allow the immigrant to hold onto his or her background in addition to 
adapting into the host society.  This form of cultural integration involves having a 
knowledge of the host country language and cultural standards which allows them to 
adapt to a new way of life and opens possibilities of participation (in this case, political) 
in the host culture. Such adaptation associates higher rates of immigrants in social 
networks of the host society, including but not limited to friendships, partnerships, 
marriages, and membership in voluntary organizations (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, 
p. 10).    
Based on the literature, cultural integration of immigrants may be significant at 
the level of the public policy sphere through, for instance, the way the immigrants 
identify and participate in the host country political process.  To begin, John Garcia’s 
study on Mexican migrants to the U.S. found five socio-cultural factors that were 
identified which often affects the integration process. The first factor was language use 
                                                          
2
 Weinstein, Megan (2011) "European Integration: A Plan to Make the Grade," Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: 
Vol. 16 Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol16/iss1/10 
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and proficiency, which in an economic sense, greater levels of English language facility 
improve one's occupational status and earnings (Tienda and Niedart, 1980, p. 378); in 
other words, levels of English language proficiency and Spanish were found to be critical 
factors in political participation. The next factor relates to cultural traditions, customs, 
and lifestyles which can disconnect the migrant from achieving a strong sense of 
belonging to the host society. Cross-pressures to maintain group solidarity as preferences 
(Arce, 1977; Garcia, 1982, p. 378) serve as adaptive responses to a new social system; 
yet, group solidarity is weakened by social contacts which are a feature of modern life 
(Borrie, 1957, p. 45). Finally, the last set of factors relates to experiential developments 
resulting from exposure to American society, which would include: length of residence in 
the U.S.; education in the U.S.; intermarriage; and naturalization status (Garcia, 1982, p. 
388). 
There is however a clear gap in the literature focusing on the social or cultural 
integration of immigrants which possibly has to do with the intricacies involved in 
operationalizing such concepts. Where measures of assimilation and/or integration are 
used, they are typically utilized as independent variables to calculate immigrant earnings 
(Kalbach, Hardwick, Vintila & Kalbach, 2002; Kalbach & Kalbach, 1995; 1999; Isajiw, 
Sev’er & Dreidger, 1993; Breton, Isajiw, Kalbach & Reitz, 1990; Boyd, Goyder, Jones, 
McRoberts, Pineo & Porter, 1985). In fact, in many studies of assimilation and 
integration, the response variable is “income” or “socio-economic status;” therefore, 
implied is the theory that economic equality with the native-born is required for 
immigrant integration. However, this assumption has not been tested; it is therefore not 
known if economic success in fact predicts, or is even associated with, acculturation 
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(Walters, Phythian, and Anicef, 2007, p. 40).  This concept will be analyzed in the third 
hypothesis which proposes that economic integration will explain the relationship 
between both ethnicity and cultural integration and political participation. 
Further, empirical research illustrates that structural and cultural dimensions of 
integration are strongly correlated. In a study done on migrants within the Netherlands, it 
was shown that migrants with good social positions (i.e. high education, stable job) 
commonly also have more informal contact with native Dutch people and more 
frequently support ‘modern’ ideas and values than other migrants (Dagevos, 2001; Odé, 
2002, as cited in Snel, E., Engerbersen, G., & Leerkes, A., 2006). In other words, 
migrants’ strong transnational involvement and integration into the host country do not 
rule each other out (Portes, Haller, & Guarnizo, 2002, p. 281). On the other hand, this 
may differ according to class: ‘Those [immigrants] who have income, education, and 
language skills are more likely to be able to choose transnational activism, while those 
with less social and cultural capital are more likely to be forced into it’ (Levittt, 2003, 
p.183). For underprivileged migrant groups rather, continuing transnational 
identifications and retaining the customs of the home country may impede adequate 
incorporation into the host country (Joppke & Morawska 2003; Levitt 2003; Morawska 
2003). In short, through the literature, it is difficult to extract the exact variables and 
connections between cultural integration and political participation of migrants; however, 
when linked with economic factors, the patterns and effects of culture on political 
participation appear to be much more visible. 
Based on the literature, cultural integration of immigrants may be significant at 
the level of the public policy sphere through, for instance, the way the immigrants 
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identify and participate in the host country political process.  This area is significant in 
understanding integration in that as meeting within the political process and deciding 
together the future of society is a sign of a high level of social inclusion and cultural 
acceptance, access to culture may improve the individual’s ability to understand other 
cultures and function in both their own as well as foreign cultures. It may also promote 
the understanding that inter-cultural exchanges enhance social cohesion.   
Aim 2: To consider whether and how cultural integration and more specifically 
ethnic differences in cultural integration affect political participation. 
H2:  Cultural integration is positively linked to political participation.  I also propose 
that cultural integration will have an attenuating effect on the previously examined 
relationship between ethnicity and political participation. This hypothesis was based on 
previous research which has shown the connection between language proficiency, which 
impacted economic levels, which then impacted political participation (Garcia) which I 
utilize in the Arab Cultural Identification Index which tests language usage and its 
meaningfulness in affecting integration.  The other variable which this hypothesis was 
based on was the participation in Arab cultural events which has been shown to 
disconnect the migrant from achieving a strong sense of belonging to the host society 
(Garcia, 1987, p. 388).  The third variable tested in the Arab Cultural Identification Index 
examined related to other forms of exposure to American society, which would include 
intermarriage; and naturalization status (Garcia, 1987, p. 388) which I utilized to fit with 
and test the variables of citizenship and the importance of marriage to someone of Arabic 
background.  Finally, for my fourth measure of cultural integration, I utilized the variable 
which measures the strength of ties with the country of origin through the frequency of 
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return visits there. The frequency declines over the years, but is also a function of 
income, such that the longer immigrants have been settled the more money they are likely 
to be able to spend on visits if that is what they wish (Banton, National Integration in 
France and Britain, 2001, p. 161).                                                                            
Analytic Approach:   The bivariate relationship between cultural integration and each 
measure of political participation will be examined.  Multivariate analysis will expand the 
multivariate models tested in H1 to account for cultural integration and test: 1) the 
relationship between cultural integration and political participation controlling for model 
covariates and 2) the attenuating effect that cultural integration has on the relationship 
between ethnicity and political participation. 
Political Participation and Economic Integration 
Relevant Literature:   
As indicated earlier in this dissertation, much of the literature on immigrant 
political participation focuses on the link between economic integration and cultural 
integration. More so, Verba and Nie emphasize the importance of socioeconomic status 
in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation 
(Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 201). Further, the assimilation thesis has its roots in the work of 
Gordon (1964); according to this theory, immigrants, and recent immigrants most of all, 
may not be well enough assimilated to the world of work and the community to become 
fully involved in politics. They adapt to their new economic environment in time, and 
then to the political environment, while their descendants are more entirely adapted. Thus 
integration or assimilation can be seen as a generationally-phased process. Reitz makes 
the same case in his explanation of the socioeconomic measurement of the relationship 
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between ethnic identification and political participation (Reitz, 1980, p. 380).  Further, a 
number of theoretical orientations suggest determining how much of the observed 
variation in participation among ethnic groups can be accounted for by variation in 
background socioeconomic and demographic characteristics across the groups. For 
instance, the DAAS included several questions about respondents' socioeconomic 
characteristics. Chief among these variables are education and income (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, p. 469; Verba & Nie, 1972 p. 97; Wolfinger & 
Rosenstone, 1980, p. 25). Baglioni for instance, suggests that successful economic 
integration is a necessary (though not sufficient) step for socio-cultural integration 
(Baglioni, 1964, p. 126).  For example, immigrants who arrive to their destination 
country with more economic resources, particularly in the form of human capital, are 
thought to experience more rapid assimilation than those with fewer resources (Djajic, 
2003, p. 831). This link between economic success and assimilation is so pervasive that 
researchers, it would seem, have taken for granted that cultural and economic 
assimilation are inextricably linked, if not one and the same (Porter, 1965, pp. 460-462). 
It is worth mentioning here that the Chaldean American community’s residential patterns 
within Metro Detroit consisted of residing inside of Detroit in affordable housing until 
their purchase of local liquor stores became increasingly successful to allow them to 
move to surrounding wealthier suburbs.  Although Chaldeans are associated with being 
Arab-Americans and hold many similarities among them, such as their independent 
business ventures, knowledge of the Arabic language and roots from Iraq, they have 
worked to create their own distinct and recognizable communities while associating with 
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the values of other cultural groups of the same income levels (Sengstock, 1982, pp. 7 -
11).   
The cultural and economic differences between the two ethnic groups, Yemenis 
and Lebanese are a compelling reason to study their political behavior. A connection 
between political participation and civic integration and empathy for the host country is 
worthwhile mentioning.  One of my findings as described in the methodology chapter, 
concerning economic success as the ultimate moderating factor for political participation, 
could be used to argue that western democratic involvement is less a function of 
ethnic/cultural origin and more a function of economics.  That is to say that, despite the 
fact that the bivariate analyses showed participation differences between the Lebanese 
and the Yemenis, once you engage in counterfactual thinking (by adjusting or controlling 
for economic achievement) you find that the situation would have been different (the two 
groups' participation patterns are not statistically distinguishable) had the two groups had 
similar economic achievement levels. This finding as shown across all three political 
participation outcomes, as described in my methods/results chapter, and is illustrated in 
the multivariable complete adjusted models.  Though the latter is not a new finding, in 
my case it could be made more specific to groups that some researchers, in the literature 
on Arabs and the Middle East, argue to be inherently (i.e. culturally and so on) 
undemocratic and incompatible or unwilling to accept the western liberal creed. Further 
results as presented in the methodology, show that economic integration in terms of home 
ownership and business ownership leads to a higher level of political participation and to 
a higher likelihood of political engagement, which is in line with the literature. Studies of 
the economic and social integration of immigrants have analyzed immigrants’ earnings 
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and employment opportunities in relation to those of the native-born and how 
immigrants’ education, occupational mobility, as well as English-language ability change 
with the passage of time in the U.S. (Borjas, 1999; Stevens, 1992; Portes & MacLeod, 
1999; Espenshade & Fu, 1997; Lopez, 1999 as cited in Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 
2001, p. 870).  Additionally, studies of political integration have focused primarily on the 
determinants of naturalization and differences in citizenship acquisition across different 
nationalities (Portes & Mozo, 1985, pp. 37-39 & Yang, 1994, p. 449). Hence, stable 
multivariate statistical results based on large samples are needed to determine whether 
many of the common-sense explanations of the naturalization process are erroneous or 
plausible propositions. Moreover, past research has given less attention to the influence 
of larger social contexts in the country of origin and the country of destination in the 
naturalization process. Specifically, most previous studies have tended to overlook the 
effects of country of origin characteristics on immigrants' propensity to naturalize (Yang, 
1994, pg. 449). “Scholars of immigrant incorporation have paid considerably less 
attention to voting and other forms of political participation that occur after 
naturalization” (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, p. 870).  Illegal aliens would be 
expected to integrate less because of their illegal status, however for the most part; 
Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants are legal.   
      Indeed it is highly probable that Yemen-Americans’ attachment to their 
motherland and their hopes of someday returning there has hampered their ability to fully 
integrate into their host country's social systems, as is true of other country of origin-
oriented immigrant groups.  Yemeni-Americans, reveal inclinations that would exemplify 
them as both voluntary and involuntary minorities; voluntary in that they emigrate for 
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economic reasons.  However, Yemen is one of the world’s poorest countries due to an 
unstable economy and no significant economy-boosting exports.  As a result, many 
Yemenis find it necessary to emigrate in search of better jobs and consistent incomes for 
the families they leave behind.  It is this search for prosperity and "the American dream" 
that many Yemeni-Americans feel makes them true Americans; thus the desire to shirk 
the minority status.   
Moreover, economic and political conditions in Yemen play a critical role in 
determining integration patterns of first generation Yemeni-American immigrants.  Also 
true of other immigrant-generating societies, a lower standard of living in Yemen 
compared to that of the U.S. encourages their inclination for settlement in the U.S. due to 
the higher cost of return.  For instance, ‘chief among the circumstances that have driven 
Yemenis from their native lands are: poverty, political and social oppression, colonialism 
and war’ (Abraham, p. 3). In addition, the unstable political environment in Yemen also 
encourages the permanent integration or permanent residence without much integration 
of Yemeni-Americans. This is not true of Lebanese-Americans who have consciously 
worked to achieve a white identity which coincides with their economic interests and one 
that does not conflict with their phenotype nor political identities back home, thus they 
are less likely to perceive themselves as a minority compared to Iraqi and Yemeni 
migrants (Ajrouch, 2007, p. 873).  Because the decision to obtain citizenship depends on 
cultural, economic, and political assimilation, naturalization is probably a composite 
measure of the immigrants' permanent settlement.  In addition to being a measure of 
economic attainment and social class standing, home ownership in the host country can 
be an economic barometer of roots-taking because it normally represents a long-term 
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commitment to the adopted country.   
Aim 3:  To consider the role of economic integration of immigrants on their political 
participation.  
H3:   Economic integration will be positively related to political participation, i.e., the 
more immigrants’ work brings them into inter-ethnic contact the greater will be their 
political participation in their new society.  Furthermore, I propose that economic 
integration will explain the relationship between both ethnicity and cultural integration 
and political participation. This expectation is derived from Verba and Nie’s theory that 
emphasizes the importance of socioeconomic status in developing positive political 
orientations and increased levels of political participation (Verba & Nie, 1972, p.  152). 
Verba and Nie were among the first to explicate this model as an explanation of mass 
political behavior: individuals with high levels of socioeconomic resources (e.g., 
education and income) are more likely to adopt psychological orientations that motivate 
their participation in the political system. Numerous studies have confirmed their finding 
that citizens with higher levels of education, income, and occupational status tend to vote 
more, contact more, organize more, and campaign more than do those with lower status 
(Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 155). Most studies that confirm the SES model have mostly 
utilized samples of non-Hispanics, and it would be assumed that socioeconomic status 
works similarly across ethnic groups. However, there has been some empirical evidence 
illustrating mixed results. Lien (1994a, 1994b, p. 254), for example, finds that education 
is significantly related to participation among Mexican-Americans, but not for Asian-
Americans, while Dawson, Brown, and Allen find that education and income are only 
occasionally related to participation among African-Americans (Dawson, Brown, & 
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Allen, 1990, p. 96). Additionally, the socioeconomic status model that I used is tested 
using two standard demographic indicators:  Education and Income. Thus, it would be of 
interest to evaluate the impact of socioeconomic status in determining its impact on the 
political participation of Yemeni and Lebanese-Americans in an effort to consider 
whether or not this ethnic community varies from other ethnic groups in the U.S., as well 
as if it demonstrates any differences among the subgroup themselves.  
Analytic Approach:  The bivariate relationship between economic integration and each 
measure of political participation will be examined.  Multivariate analysis will expand the 
multivariate models tested in H3 to account for economic integration and test: 1) the 
relationship between economic integration and political participation controlling for 
model covariates and 2) the attenuating effect that economic integration has on the 
relationship between ethnicity and political participation. 
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Chapter Three 
Methods and Data Analysis 
3.1 Analytical Methods  
    I will use data from the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS, 2003) to examine 
key dimensions of integration and their relationship with political participation (Baker, 
W., Stockton, R., Howell, S., Jamal, A., Lin, A., Shryock, A., Tessler, M., 2003). Yemeni 
respondents will be compared to their Lebanese counterpart to highlight shared and 
differentiating factors associated with variation in the two groups’ response patterns and 
degrees of integration. The Lebanese group is chosen as the reference group because of 
common Muslim orientations (though mostly Shi’a among Lebanese), and contrasting 
educational and income levels and length of stay being that the Lebanese-American 
community is much more established and comparably better off economically than the 
Yemeni community.  Comparatively assessing the data on Lebanese-Americans, a group 
with high levels of attributed integration provides an area of research that is significant in 
that there has been relatively little effort to understand the varied patterns and problems 
of immigrant integration even within established cultural categories such as “Arab.” I 
expect Yemeni-Americans overall to be less integrated and less politically active than 
their Lebanese-American counterparts.  The reasons for these differences are likely to be 
explained by cultural and economic differences. Study findings will inform the 
understanding of ethnicity and American politics in general, and will shed light on intra-
Arab ethnic differences in particular providing preliminary answers relating to how two 
culturally and economically divergent groups adjust and adapt to the American political 
environment. 
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 The concept of integration is conceptually problematic. In the 
immigration/incorporation discourse, integration has quite often been understood as an 
individual property. This approach has been popularized by social psychologists (among 
others, John Berry) that have operationalized integration in terms of participation in 
mainstream society in the economic (educational) sphere but maintaining traditional 
language and values in the private sphere. I intend to examine the levels of political 
integration among Yemeni- and Lebanese-American immigrants by investigating a series 
of indicators probing participants’ political participation. More specifically, I will look at 
self-reports of voting registration, presidential voting, petition signing, monetary 
contribution, contacts with government officials, and engagement in protests.  To 
examine cultural and economic integration, which are treated as predictor variables, I will 
analyze indicators of social acculturation and economic achievement. To study the 
former, I will look at questions probing respondents’ social and cultural norms, and 
behavior.  To analyze the latter, I will look at socioeconomic measures including income, 
educational attainment, employment status and home ownership.   
 The study analysis will be done using data from the DAAS.  The DAAS is a 
companion survey to the 2003 Detroit Area Study (DAS), and includes a representative 
sample of the adult Arab and Chaldean population aged 18 and older residing in 
households in the three-county Detroit metropolitan area  (n = 1000). The DAAS is based 
on a dual-frame sample design. The joint structure for the 2003 DAAS probability sample 
design consists of two component parts: 1) an area probability frame used to choose area 
segments from Census tracts in which 10% of more of persons were self-classified as of 
Arab- or Chaldean- American ancestry in the 2000 Census; and 2) a list frame for 
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selecting housing units from mailing and membership lists of 13 Arab- and Chaldean- 
American organizations (Baker, Stockton, Howell, Jamal, Lin, Shryock & Tessler, 2003). 
Further, the area probability sample component of the DAAS is based on a conventional 
three stage sample design, a principal stage sample of area segment units followed by a 
second stage sample of housing units within area segments and random selection of one 
eligible adult respondent in households with one or more eligible persons.3 The 
geographic domain for the area probability component of the DAAS design consisted of 
the 60 Census tracts in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties in which at least 10% of 
the 2000 U.S. Census population self-identified as Arab- or Chaldean-American. These 
tracts included 49% of the total population of self-identified Arab- and Chaldean-
Americans in the three-county area in 2000.  It should be noted that once the sample 
populations needed for this dissertation were extracted from the DAAS, there will be 
some hazards in relying on fewer cases, which is explained in additional detail in the 
limitations section of this dissertation.  
The DAAS provides a unique look at Arab Americans living in the Detroit 
metropolitan area following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States. 
The data account for respondent information and opinions on their experiences since the 
September 11th  attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, however, with 
more emphasis being placed on questions of social trust, confidence in institutions, 
intercultural relationships, local social capital, and attachments to transnational 
                                                          
3
 DAAS recruited a variety of interviewers, most from the Arab and Chaldean communities. Almost all 
were bilingual.. They were recruited and trained by the Institute of Social Research's Survey Research 
Team. All were pledged to confidentiality. The training sessions went on for two days. Each person who 
was interviewed was asked if they wanted a bilingual interviewer. There is an item in the survey that tells 
the percent who did. More often they did the interview in English but switched back and forth .They were 
also asked if they wanted a female interviewer, which some did. DAAS accommodated those requests 
(often on the site since typically interviewers went out in teams). 
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communities, respondent characteristics, and community needs.  Some of the examples of 
the issues addressed in the data included analyses that ranged from respondents’ 
frequency of religious participation, their level of political activism, their level of 
interaction with people outside of their cultural, racial, and ethnic groups (a measure of 
social integration), and the quality of the social and political institutions in their area. The 
DAAS also surveyed components of background information which included the 
variables: birth country, citizenship status, citizenship status of spouse, education, home 
ownership status, household income, language spoken in the home (if not English), 
marital status, number of children (under 18) in the household, parents' countries of birth 
and citizenship status political affiliation, total number of people living in the household, 
voter registration status, whether the respondent ever served in the United States Armed 
Forces, and the year of immigration, if not born in the United States. In utilizing this 
survey’s data, my study will incorporate appropriate statistical analyses, featuring 
regression models.  
 
3.2 Subpopulation of Interest 
 Given the study’s focus, all analytical work was restricted to the two ethnic 
groups of interest.  In order to determine from the DAAS results, who were Lebanese and 
who were Yemeni, I used the values from the groupings which were based on responses 
to a series of questions probing: 1) the respondents’ country of birth; 2) their parents’ (i.e. 
mother and father) country of birth; and 3) their grandparents’ (both maternal and 
parental) country of birth. Individuals were considered Lebanese if they reported being 
born in Lebanon, or if they answered “Lebanon” to any of the following questions: 1) in 
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what country was your mother born? 2) in what country was her mother born? 3) in what 
country was your father born? and 4) in what country was his father born? Consequently, 
and individual was coded as Yemeni if they reported being born in Yemen or if they 
answered Yemeni to any one of the above stated questions. The resulting subpopulation 
included 292 respondents, with 221 classified as Lebanese-Americans and the rest (i.e. 
n=71) as Yemeni-Americans.   
 
3.3 Outcomes of Interest  
Three main outcomes pertaining to political integration were considered.  First, 
registering to vote was measured dichotomously (0=No; 1=Yes) using respondents’ 
answers to a question probing whether they are currently registered to vote. Second, 
voting was also measured dichotomously (0=No; 1=Yes) based on participants’ response 
to a question examining whether they have voted in the last presidential election. Third, 
political activism was measured as a composite additive score of four indicators probing 
whether respondents incorporated into the model participated in the following political 
activities:  1) signed petition, measured by the DAAS question:  Have you ever signed a 
petition?  2) contributed money for a political cause or candidate, measured by the DAAS 
question:  Since January 2000, have you contributed money to any organization that 
supported political candidates? 3) called/wrote a government official, measured by the 
DAAS question:  In the past 12 months, have you called or written a government official 
to express your opinion on a political issue?; and 4) protested, measured by the DAAS 
question:  In the past 12 months, have you taken part in a protest, march, or 
demonstration about any social or political issue? Individual indicators were coded 
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dichotomously (0=No; 1=Yes) and the resulting range for the additive activism score was 
0-4.  
 
3.4 Predictors and Controls 
Three main predictors were of interest to this study: 1) ethnicity, 2) cultural 
integration, and 3) economic integration. First, Ethnicity was equated to country of origin 
and measured dichotomously (0=Lebanese; 1=Yemeni). Second, Cultural Integration 
was measured using an Arab Cultural Identification index based on the survey questions 
probing the following information: 1) citizenship, 2) Arabic language usage and 
meaningfulness, 3) the importance of marriage to someone of Arabic background; 4) 
importance of participation in Arab cultural events; and 5) frequency of visits to the 
country of origin.  Individual scale items were coded so that higher values indicate higher 
Arab identification. I argue that a respondent who registers high on this Arab Cultural 
Identification index will correspondingly have lower levels of cultural integration within 
the host country.   It should also be noted that analytic work for the voting outcome is 
conditioned (i.e. restricted to the subpopulation of) on registering to vote because only 
those registered to vote can vote. However, given the literature, the use of citizenship was 
highlighted as an important indicator of acculturation and political involvement in the 
host country. 
Third, Economic Integration as an index was operationalized using four variables 
including: 1) home ownership, 2) education, 3) income and 4) employment. Home 
ownership was measured dichotomously (0=rent; 1=own) using a question probing 
whether the respondent or his/her family own or rent the place where they live now. 
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Education was measured as a categorical variable (less than high school; some high 
school; some college or more) by recoding respondents answers about the highest grade 
of school or degree that they completed. Income was measured using ten categories 
intervals based on a question probing a respondent’s income group that includes:  Income 
being treated as a continuous variable in the analytical models. Recodes were based on 
information gathered from several questions including 1) whether respondent was 
currently doing any work for pay, 2) whether a respondent was working part-time or full 
time, and 3) whether a respondent’s job involved self-employment or employment by 
someone.  
Five control variables were also accounted for in my analysis. First, Age in years was 
included as a continuous measure. Second, respondent party identification was coded as a 
three category variable reflecting whether a respondent identified as a Republican, a 
Democrat, or an Independent. Third, marital status was coded dichotomously (0=not 
married; 1=married).4  Fourth, gender was also measured dichotomously. Finally, 
ideology was measured using a question gauging how a respondent would describe 
his/her political and social outlook. Five response categories were registered for this 
indicator including very conservative, moderately conservative, middle-of-the-road, 
moderately liberal, or very liberal. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 This is important because marriage assumes more economic maturity. One needs to achieve a certain level 
of economic independence to start a family.  Additionally, married individuals tend to be a bit more 
conservative, and have more stable roots in the community in which they reside. All these reasons would 
lead one to believe that they are more likely to participate in politics. 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
My data analysis was conducted in three steps. First, I used univariate analysis 
including means (when continuous) and frequency tabulations (if categorical) to examine 
the distributions of all the indicators used in this study.  The resulting descriptive 
statistics are included in Table 1. Second, I used bivariate analysis, including correlations 
(when continuous) and cross-tabulations (if categorical) to examine unadjusted 
relationships between the main outcomes and predictors of interest.  The objective of 
bivariate analysis is also to identify subgroup differences on the political participation 
measures. This was primarily intended to test for substantive and statistical variations in 
political participation, and cultural and economic integration between the two ethnic 
groups.  
Additionally, bivariate analysis was conducted to examine the relationships 
between political participation and cultural and economic integration. Unpaired-samples 
t-tests were used to examine statistically significant means differences for continuous 
variables, and Pearson's chi-squared tests were used to test for overall statistical 
independence between categorical variables. Mean levels and bivariate frequencies in 
addition to p-values resulting from the statistical tests are presented in Table 2. Third, I 
used multivariable regression to examine the relationship between the outcomes of 
interest and my main predictors controlling for covariates to account for possible 
confounding effects. Finally, logistic regression models were used with dichotomous 
outcomes (i.e. registering to vote and voting), and Poisson regression was used with the 
political activism score to account for the count nature of the resulting indicator. The 
variables:  registering to vote and vote were analyzed as dichotomous being that for those 
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not registered to vote cannot vote, therefore, all the analysis for the voting variable were 
conditioned on respondents indicating registering to vote. 
Logit regression models allow me to “explore how each explanatory variable 
affects the probability of the event occurring.”5 To facilitate interpretation, model 
estimates will be presented as odds ratios and will include the corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals (Table 6). The odds ratios help to avoid non-intuitive log-odds 
interpretations resulting from standard logit model coefficient estimate and rather focus 
on the change in the odds of the occurrence of an event (i.e. outcome=1) that is associated 
with a unit change in explanatory variable under consideration. To further facilitate 
interpretation, predicted probabilities for the main predictors of interest will be calculated 
and graphed.  In short, because I am using dichotomous variables and I have a data set 
with binomial outcomes, and if I want to model my data as having logistic errors, and the 
predictors as having linear effect on the outcome, I therefore model the dichotomous 
outcomes by using the log odds. 
Poisson regression uses the probability function of the Poisson distribution to 
model the rate of occurrence of an outcome conditional on a series of predictors and 
covariates6. Incidence rate ratios and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals are 
presented in Table 6. To further facilitate interpretation predicted rates of counts will be 
calculated and graphed7.  
 
                                                          
5
 Long. S, and Freese. J. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata. 2nd Edition. 
Stata Press: College Station, Texas. (P.131)  Chapter 4. 
6
 Cameron. C, and Trivedi. P. Microeconometrics Using State. Revised Edition. Stata Press: College 
Station, Texas. Chapter 17. 
7
 Long. S, and Freese. J. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata. 2nd Edition. 
Stata Press: College Station, Texas. Chapter 8. 
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Figure 2.  Model 
 
     
3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Univariate results 
Univariate descriptive statistics for the study controls and predictors are presented 
in Table 1. An overwhelming majority of the included respondents were married 
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(76.7%). The study sample was equally divided between males and females.8 Close to 
two-fifths of respondents indicated being Independent or having no party preference 
(57.5%), while a quarter identified themselves as Democrats (26.9%), and the remaining 
as Republicans (15.5%). A plurality of respondents (45%) identified as having a very 
conservative or conservative political and ideology, and only close to 1 in 7 reported 
having a Liberal ideology (15.63%). Finally, the average age in the study sample was 
about 42 years. 
Most of the study respondents were of Lebanese descent (79.5%), with the rest 
meeting my classification criteria as being of Yemeni descent.9 The distribution of the 
cultural integration indicator was fairly normal ranging from a minimum score of 2 to a 
maximum of 35. The average cultural integration score was 15.95 (SE=0.38). Close to 
half of the respondents indicated having a high school education or less, and about a 
quarter reported having a college degree or more (24.8%). Study respondents were 
equally likely to be poor and well to do with close to 30% indicating a household income 
of less than $20,000 and similar prevalence reporting an income of $75,000 or more. 
Home ownership was highly prevalent with only 1 in 5 respondents indicating renting or 
otherwise (19.38%).  Finally, close to a third of the study sample specified not working as 
their employment status, and 12.5% indicated being retired. Business ownership was 
relatively high at 16%, with the rest of the sample respondents (40%) indicating being 
employed by someone else. 
 
                                                          
8
 Interviewers were trained and interviews were conducted in a face-to-face format. 
9
 Here the sampling mechanism is supposed to generate prevalence rates that represent the community. The 
Lebanese population in the tri-county area is much larger than the Yemeni population, and that is reflected 
in the sample composition. 
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Table 1.Univariate Descriptive Statistics of Predictors and Controls 
   
Total Lebanese Yemenis Sig-Test 
   
N % % % 
 Control Variables 
     
 
Married 
     
  
No 100 23.31 24.07 15.48 
P=0.092 
  
Yes 329 76.69 75.93 84.52 
 
Sex 
     
  
Female 206 48.7 52.04 32.53 
P<0.01 
  
Male 217 51.3 47.96 67.47 
 
Party ID 
     
  
Republican 64 15.53 18.39 3.70 
P<0.01 
  
Democrat 111 26.94 27.10 24.69 
  
Independent 237 57.52 54.52 71.60 
 
Ideology 
     
  
Very Conservative 74 17.79 15.19 30.38 
P=0.011   
Moderately Conservative 113 27.16 26.90 29.11 
  
Middle of the Road/Something Else 164 39.42 40.51 32.91 
  
Moderately Liberal 48 11.54 12.66 6.33 
  
Very Liberal 17 4.09 4.75 1.27 
    
Mean Mean Mean 
 
 
Age 
 
41.88 43.29 36.10 P<0.01 
Ethnicity 
     
  
Lebanese 324 79.41 n/a n/a 
 
  
Yemenis 84 20.59 n/a n/a 
 
    
Mean Mean Mean 
 Cultural Integration 
 
15.95 16.08 13.43 P<0.01 
Economic Indicators 
     
 
Education 
     
  
LT HS 117 27.4 23.53 49.40 
P<0.01 
  
HS 90 21.08 18.89 28.92 
  
Some College 114 26.7 29.72 15.66 
  
College or more 106 24.82 27.86 6.02 
 
Income 
     
  
LESS THAN $10,000 48 12.94 12.13 17.50 
P<0.01 
  
$10,000 - 14,999 33 8.89 7.35 16.25 
  
$15,000 - 19,999 25 6.74 5.88 10.00 
  
$20,000 - 29,999 51 13.75 10.29 26.25 
  
$30,000 - 49,999 54 14.56 16.18 8.75 
  
$50,000 - 74,999 48 12.94 13.60 8.75 
  
$75,000- 99,999 35 9.43 10.29 3.75 
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$100,000 - 149,999 44 11.86 13.24 5.00 
  
$150,000 - 199,999 18 4.85 5.88 2.50 
  
$200,000 OR MORE 15 4.04 5.15 1.25 
 
Home ownership 
     
  
Rent or Other 81 19.38 16.14 35.37 
P<0.01 
  
Own 337 80.62 83.86 64.63 
 
Employment Status 
     
  
Not working 134 31.6 30.31 36.14 
P<0.01 
  
Retired 53 12.5 13.44 6.02 
  
Employed 169 39.86 36.25 54.22 
  
Own a Business 68 16.04 20.00 3.61 
 
Descriptive statistics for the study outcomes are presented in Table 2. About two 
thirds of the respondents were registered to vote. Among those registered to vote 72% 
reported having voted in the last presidential election. As expected, lower prevalence 
rates were registered for the considered political activism indicators. About a quarter 
indicated having signed a petition, 12.5% contributed money to a political cause or a 
political candidate, about 1 in 10 respondents reported calling or writing a government 
official, and a similar percentage of respondents indicated having participated in a 
political protest. When political activism was examined as a scale, about two thirds were 
coded as having no political activism, and 17.5% having only one activity. The 
prevalence rate was less than 1% at the highest level of activism (4 political activities).  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Study Outcomes 
  N % 
Registered to vote   
 No 156 36.62 
 Yes 270 63.38 
Did you vote   
 No 76 28.15 
 Yes 194 71.85 
Signed a petition   
 No 320 74.77 
 Yes 108 25.23 
Contributed money   
 No 372 87.53 
 Yes 53 12.47 
Called or written a government official  
 No 382 89.88 
 Yes 43 10.12 
Participated in a Political protest   
 No 380 89.2 
 Yes 46 10.8 
Political Participation Scale   
 No Activity 281 66.43 
 1 Activity 74 17.49 
 2 Activities 34 8.04 
 3 Activities 31 7.33 
 4 Activities 3 0.71 
 
3.5.2 Bivariate statistics   
At the bivariate level of this dissertation's analysis, Lebanese respondents were 
more likely to participate in politics compared to Yemenis. This finding was consistent 
across all the examined measures, with the exception of protest reports (Table 2). 
Lebanese respondents were twice as likely to be registered to vote, close to 35% more 
likely to report voting, and two and a half times more likely to have signed a petition. 
Differences were especially marked with monetary contributions and communication 
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with politicians with Lebanese respondents being more than 4 times more likely to report 
having engaged in the activity relative to Yemenis. 
Table 3. Bivariate association between political participation and ethnicity 
  Political Participation Indicators 
  Lebanese Yemenis  
  N % N %  
Registered to vote      
 Yes 222 68.94 29 34.94 
P<0.001  No 100 31.06 54 65.06 
 Total 322 100 83 100 
Voting      
 Yes 164 73.87 16 55.17 
P=0.035  No 58 26.13 13 44.83 
 Total 222 100 29 100 
Ever signed a petition      
 Yes 88 27.24 9 10.71 
P=0.002  No 235 72.76 75 89.29 
 Total 323 100 84 100 
Contributed money      
 Yes 47 14.69 3 3.57 
P=0.006  No 273 85.31 81 96.43 
 Total 320 100 84 100 
Called/Written government official      
 Yes 35 10.9 2 2.38 
P=0.016  No 286 89.1 82 97.62 
 Total 321 100 84 100 
Protest      
 Yes 30 9.32 10 12.05 
P=0.457  No 292 90.68 73 87.95 
 Total 322 100 83 100 
 
Political participation was also related to cultural integration (Table 4). Higher 
levels of cultural integration [measurements included:  citizenship; Arabic language 
usage and meaningfulness; the importance of marriage to someone of Arabic 
background; the importance of participation in Arab cultural events; and frequency of 
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visits to the country of origin] were uncovered with every political measure considered, 
with the exception of political protest. Average cultural scores were 40% higher among 
the registered to vote, 17% higher among voters, 50% higher among those reporting 
having signed a petition, 26% higher among monetary contributors, and 45% higher for 
those reporting communication with government officials.  In short, my aims were to 
look at differences between ethnic groups and to see if those differences would be 
modified by factors other than ethnicity. In my work thus, far I have provided bivariate 
evidence showing no differences between the two groups. They basically both protest at 
the same rate.  Given this, any analytic work on political protest for instance, would 
assume no difference between the two ethnic groups.  
Table 4. Bivariate association between political participation and cultural 
integration 
  
Cultural Integration 
(Range=0-34) 
  Mean SE Test 
Registering to vote    
 No 12.4 0.5 
P<0.01 
 Yes 17.3 0.5 
Voting    
 No 15.4 0.9 
P<0.01 
 Yes 18.1 0.5 
Signed a petition    
 No 13.7 0.4 
P<0.01 
 Yes 20.5 0.7 
Contributed money    
 No 14.9 0.4 
P<0.01 
 Yes 18.8 1.0 
Called or written government official    
 No 14.7 0.4 
P<0.01 
 Yes 21.4 1.1 
Protest    
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 No 15.5 0.4 
P=0.5099 
 Yes 14.9 0.9 
 
All of the economic measures in this study were statistically associated with the 
political participation indicators, again except for protest. As expected, a higher economic 
classification (irrespective of the measure) led to a higher propensity of engagement in 
politics. This was largely consistent with the exception of protest where statistical 
significance was not attained in relation to home ownership and employment status. 
Detailed results and tests of significance are presented in Table 5.  
Table 5. Bivariate association between political participation and economic 
achievement 
Economic Indicators 
Home Ownership Rent or Other Own a Home      
   N % N % Test     
 Voting          
  No 15 20.27 59 79.73 
P<0.0001 
    
  Yes 11 5.82 178 94.18     
 Registering to vote        
  No 54 35.53 98 64.47 
P<0.0001 
    
  Yes 26 9.89 237 90.11     
 Signed a petition         
  No 74 23.95 235 76.05 
P<0.0001 
    
  Yes 7 6.48 101 93.52     
 Contributed money        
  No 79 21.88 282 78.12 
 P=0.002 
    
  Yes 2 3.77 51 96.23     
 Called or written government official       
  No 80 21.51 292 78.49 
 P=0.002 
    
  Yes 1 2.38 41 97.62     
 Taken part in protest        
  No 74 20 296 80 
P=0.440 
    
  Yes 7 15.22 39 84.78     
Employment Not Working Retired Employed Own a Business  
   N % N % N % N % Test 
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 Voting          
  No 23 30.67 7 9.33 34 45.33 11 14.67 
P=0.031 
  Yes 45 23.2 40 20.62 65 33.51 44 22.68 
 Registering to vote        
  No 63 41.45 6 3.95 70 46.05 13 8.55 
P<0.0001 
  Yes 68 25.28 47 17.47 99 36.8 55 20.45 
 Signed a petition         
  No 120 38.1 30 9.52 123 39.05 42 13.33 
P<0.0001 
  Yes 13 12.04 23 21.3 46 42.59 26 24.07 
 Contributed money        
  No 128 34.69 43 11.65 146 39.57 52 14.09 
P=0.001 
  Yes 5 9.62 9 17.31 23 44.23 15 28.85 
 Called or written government official       
  No 131 34.66 42 11.11 150 39.68 55 14.55 
P<0.0001 
  Yes 2 4.65 9 20.93 19 44.19 13 30.23 
 Taken part in protest        
  No 125 33.24 49 13.03 142 37.77 60 15.96 
P=0.056 
  Yes 8 17.39 4 8.7 26 56.52 8 17.39 
Education Less than HS High School Some college College or more  
   N % N % N % N % Test 
 Voting          
  No 14 18.42 16 21.05 30 39.47 16 21.05 
P=0.124 
  Yes 37 19.17 37 19.17 53 27.46 66 34.2 
 Registering to vote        
  No 65 41.94 36 23.23 30 19.35 24 15.48 
P<0.0001 
  Yes 51 18.96 53 19.7 83 30.86 82 30.48 
 Signed a petition         
  No 108 33.96 75 23.58 79 24.84 56 17.61 
P<0.0001 
  Yes 8 7.41 15 13.89 35 32.41 50 46.3 
 Contributed money        
  No 110 29.73 87 23.51 95 25.68 78 21.08 
P<0.0001 
  Yes 4 7.55 3 5.66 19 35.85 27 50.94 
 Called or written government official       
  No 114 30 87 22.89 96 25.26 83 21.84 
P<0.0001 
  Yes 0 0 3 6.98 17 39.53 23 53.49 
 Taken part in protest        
  No 112 29.63 79 20.9 95 25.13 92 24.34 
P=0.005 
  Yes 3 6.52 10 21.74 19 41.3 14 30.43 
Income            
 Mean SE Test       
 Voting          
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  No 4.99 0.32 P=0.0077       
  Yes 5.98 0.18        
 Registering to vote        
  No 3.80 0.20 P<0.001       
  Yes 5.69 0.16        
 Signed a petition         
  No 4.31 0.14 P<0.001       
  Yes 6.95 0.22        
 Contributed money        
  No 4.65 0.13 P<0.001       
  Yes 7.51 0.32        
 Called or written government official       
  No 4.78 0.14 P<0.001       
  Yes 7.05 0.35        
 Taken part in protest        
  No 4.91 0.15 P=0.0145       
  Yes 5.76 0.31        
 
3.5.3 Multivariable Models 
The regression analyses were done in four stages to incrementally account for the 
moderation effects introduced by added model covariates. First, unadjusted models 
included the main predictor of interest (ethnicity). Second, the models were adjusted to 
account for the control variables. Third, cultural integration was introduced into the 
model. Finally, the economic integration indicators were added. Models results are shown 
in Table 6. 
The two ethnic groups showed persistent differences across all three considered 
outcomes when the unadjusted (i.e. univariate) models were considered. The odds ratios 
for Yemenis registering to vote were 76% lower compared to the Lebanese group. These 
odds ratios were 56% lower when voting was considered. Finally, being Yemeni 
decreased the incidence of political participation by 53% relative to being Lebanese.  
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Accounting for the control variables partially moderated the effects of ethnicity 
on the considered outcomes. The moderation effects were especially noticeable with 
registering to vote where accounting for the covariates led to a 41% increase compared to 
the unadjusted odds. Thus, the results of this analysis show that despite the indicated 
moderations, Yemenis remained distinctly less likely to be politically engaged compared 
to the Lebanese group. These results remained consistent across all three considered 
outcomes. 
Table 6a  Logistic Regression 
Registering to Vote 
   
Unadjusted Model Adjusted Model 
Adjusted Model 
with Acculturation 
Adjusted Model with 
Acculturation and 
Economic 
Integration 
   
ORa 95% CI ORa 95% CI ORa 95% CI ORa 95% CI 
Main Predictor 
        
 
Ethnicity 
        
  
Lebanese 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 
    
  
Yemeni 0.24*** 0.15-0.40 0.42*** 0.24-0.75 0.46 0.18-1.22 0.64 0.31-1.33 
 
Cultural Integration 
    
1.03 0.98-1.08 1.05* 1.00-1.10 
Economic Integration 
        
 
Home Ownership 
        
  
No 
        
  
Yes 
      
1.46 0.69-3.1 
 
Employment 
        
  
Unemployed 
        
  
Retired 
      
3.31 0.65-16.86 
  
Employed 
      
0.91 0.42-1.93 
  
Own Business 
      
1.29 0.44-3.8 
 
Education 
        
  
Less than high school 
       
  
High school 
      
1.71 0.75-3.9 
  
Some college 
      
2.99** 1.28-6.98 
  
College or more 
      
2.14 0.83-5.56 
 
Income 
      
1.24*** 1.07-1.43 
Control Variables 
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Age in Years 
  
1.03*** 1.01-1.05 1.03*** 1.01-1.05 1.03** 1.01-1.06 
 
Marital Status 
        
  
Not married 
  
1.00 -- 
    
  
Married 
  
0.91 0.51-1.62 1.89 0.84-4.27 1.56 0.75-3.26 
 
Sex 
        
  
Female 
  
1.00 -- 
    
  
Male 
  
0.75 0.46-1.21 1.69 0.86-3.35 0.50** 0.25-1 
 
Party ID 
        
  
Republican 
  
1.00 -- 
    
  
Democrat 
  
0.24*** 0.09-0.69 0.68 0.23-2.03 0.36* 0.11-1.19 
  
Independent 
  
0.13*** 0.05-0.35 0.26*** 0.10-0.69 0.27** 0.09-0.82 
 
Social Ideology 
  
1.2 0.95-1.51 1.17 0.86-1.58 0.97 0.72-1.31 
a Odds Ratio 
b Incidence Rate Ratio 
***P<0.01 
**P<0.05 
*P<0.10 
 
   
Table 6b  Logistic Regression 
   
Voting 
   
Unadjusted Model Adjusted Model 
Adjusted Model with 
Acculturation 
Adjusted Model 
with Acculturation 
and Economic 
Integration 
   
ORa 95% CI ORa 95% CI ORa 95% CI ORa 95% CI 
Main Predictor 
 
 
      
 
Ethnicity 
 
 
      
  
Lebanese 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 
    
  
Yemeni 0.44** 0.20-0.96 0.43* 0.17-1.09 0.39*** 0.21-0.72 0.63 0.2-1.95 
 
Cultural Integration 
 
 
  
1.10*** 1.05-1.15 1.03 0.98-1.1 
Economic Integration 
 
 
      
 
Home Ownership 
 
 
      
  
No 
 
 
      
  
Yes 
 
 
    
1.09 0.33-3.6 
 
Employment 
 
 
      
  
Unemployed 
 
 
      
  
Retired 
 
 
    
0.54 0.09-3.21 
  
Employed 
 
 
    
0.48 0.17-1.3 
  
Own Business 
 
 
    
0.72 0.19-2.77 
 
Education 
 
 
      
  
Less than high school 
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High school 
 
 
    
0.95 0.29-3.12 
  
Some college 
 
 
    
0.82 0.24-2.81 
  
College or more 
 
 
    
1.51 0.36-6.28 
 
Income 
  
 
    
1.27** 1.04-1.54 
Control Variables 
 
 
      
 
Age in Years 
 
 
1.04*** 1.01-1.06 1.03*** 1.01-1.05 1.05** 1.01-1.09 
 
Marital Status 
 
 
      
  
Not married 
 
 
1.00 -- 
    
  
Married 
 
 
1.75 0.82-3.77 1.28 0.69-2.38 1.57 0.59-4.18 
 
Sex 
  
 
      
  
Female 
 
 
1.00 -- 
    
  
Male 
 
 
1.84* 0.94-3.62 0.66 0.40-1.09 1.66 0.7-3.95 
 
Party 
ID 
  
 
      
  
Republican 
 
 
1.00 -- 
    
  
Democrat 
 
 
0.6 0.21-1.77 0.28** 0.10-0.81 1.36 0.39-4.68 
  
Independent 
 
 
0.25*** 0.09-0.66 0.15*** 0.06-0.42 0.51 0.17-1.53 
 
Social Ideology 
 
 
1.2 0.88-1.62 1.06 0.83-1.35 0.95 0.66-1.37 
a Odds Ratio 
b Incidence Rate Ratio 
***P<0.01 
**P<0.05 
*P<0.10 
 
   
Table 6c  Poisson Regression 
   
Political Activism 
   
Unadjusted Model Adjusted Model 
Adjusted Model with 
Acculturation 
Adjusted Model with 
Acculturation and 
Economic Integration 
   
IRRb 95% CI IRRb 95% CI IRRb 95% CI IRRb 95% CI 
Main Predictor 
        
 
Ethnicity 
        
  
Lebanese 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 
    
  
Yemeni 0.47*** 0.31-0.72 0.55** 0.34-0.90 0.58** 0.36-0.96 1.27 0.75-2.16 
 
Cultural Integration 
    
1.04*** 1.02-1.06 1.00 0.98-1.02 
Economic Integration 
        
 
Home Ownership 
        
  
No 
        
  
Yes 
      
0.80 0.45-1.42 
 
Employment 
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Unemployed 
       
  
Retired 
      
5.33*** 2.29-12.44 
  
Employed 
      
1.90** 1.1-3.26 
  
Own Business 
     
2.47*** 1.37-4.44 
 
Education 
        
  
Less than high school 
       
  
High 
school 
      
2.70** 
1.21-6.04 
  
Some college 
     
4.67*** 2.13-10.24 
  
College or more 
     
4.98*** 2.25-11.03 
 
Income 
       
1.23*** 1.14-1.33 
Control Variables 
        
 
Age in Years 
  
1.00 0.99-1.01 0.99 0.99-1.00 0.99 0.98-1.01 
 
Marital Status 
        
  
Not 
married 
  
1.00 -- 
    
  
Married 
  
0.61** 0.45-0.84 0.68** 0.49-0.95 0.86 0.6-1.23 
 
Sex 
         
  
Female 
  
1.00 -- 
    
  
Male 
  
1.38** 1.04-1.83 1.24 0.93-1.65 0.79 0.58-1.09 
 
Party 
ID 
         
  
Republican 
  
1.00 -- 
    
  
Democrat 
  
0.44*** 0.30-0.63 0.48*** 0.33-0.70 0.63** 0.42-0.94 
  
Independent 
 
0.30*** 0.21-0.43 0.31*** 0.22-0.45 0.52*** 0.35-0.76 
 
Social Ideology 
  
1.22*** 1.07-1.40 1.18** 1.03-1.35 1.15* 0.98-1.35 
a Odds Ratio 
b Incidence Rate Ratio 
***P<0.01 
**P<0.05 
*P<0.10 
 
Covariates 
 Among the included covariates, age and party ID were significantly associated 
with being registered to vote.  Age presented a positive association with each extra year 
leading to a 3% increase in the odds of being registered.  Both reporting to be a Democrat 
and an Independent decreased the odds of being registered to vote relative to being 
Republican by 76% and 87% respectively. Age was also positively associated with the 
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odds of voting with each year leading to a 4% increase. Being male also increased the 
odds of voting relative to being female, however, the association was only marginally 
statistically significant (P<0.10).  Lastly, being Independent decreased the odds of voting 
by 75% compared to being Republican [See above]. When political activism was 
considered, marital status, sex, party ID and ideology presented statistically significant 
associations with the expected incidence. Being married decreased the incidence ratio10 
by about 39% compared to non-married respondents, while being male increased the 
incidence of activism by close to 38%. Democrats and Independents each had lower 
incidence of activism compared to Republicans. Finally, reporting a more liberal 
ideology was associated with a higher incidence of activism.  
Introducing cultural integration completely moderated the statistical difference in 
voting registration between Yemenis and Lebanese. As shown in my model, cultural 
integration was not significantly associated with registering to vote. Additionally, 
accounting for cultural integration erased the statistical distinction between Democrats 
and Republicans. However, including cultural integration in the voting model accentuated 
the differences between the Yemenis and the Lebanese further decreasing the odds of 
voting among the former group. Additionally, cultural integration, conforming to 
expectations, was positively associated with the odds of voting among both groups. 
Interestingly enough, I found that accounting for cultural integration also accentuated the 
differences between Democrats and Independents relative to Republicans with both 
groups presenting increasingly lower odds of voting (72% and 85% respectively). In 
                                                          
10
 Hardin and Hilbe (2007, p. 218). 
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short, cultural integration was also associated with an increased incidence of reported 
political activism: signing a petition; contributing money; calling/writing a government 
official; and protesting.  These cultural effects were independent of ethnic differences. 
The latter remained statistically significant even after controlling for the cultural 
variables.   
Nevertheless, it was the moderating effects of adding the economic integration 
indicators that were especially noticeable.  In other words, what this result has basically 
shown is that the higher your economic status (irrespective of who you are), that is 
associated with more political participation. With the exception of registering to vote 
where marginal significance for cultural integration was registered, doing so rendered the 
associations between both ethnicity and cultural integration and the outcomes of interest 
statistically insignificant. Only higher education, specifically “college or more,” 
presented a consistent positive effect on registration to vote and voting among both 
groups.11 Employment (being retired, employed, and owning a business) and higher 
education (all levels) were associated with increased incidence of voting.  Regarding the 
other forms of political participation (political activism), generated lower prevalence 
rates with only about a quarter of the interviewees indicating having ever signed a 
petition, 12.5% contributing money to a political cause or a political candidate, about 1 in 
10 respondents reported calling or writing a government official, and a similar percentage 
                                                          
11
  It should be noted that in addition to the models in this dissertation, I had created an additional two 
tables to account for the education variable and its significance in political integration and cultural 
integration treated as individual indicators and its impact on political integration. However, the tables did 
not  reveal anything unexpected or that would add insight to the aims of the dissertation, although they can 
be useful for future research in this area.   
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of respondents indicated having participated in a political protest. When political activism 
was examined as a scale, about two thirds were coded as having no political activism, and 
17.5% having only one activity.  Accounting for the economic indicators highlighted the 
effects of being male on registering to vote, and completely negated any statistically 
significant effects of party ID on the odds of voting and of marital status on the incidence 
of political activism.  
Graphs of significant associations in the final models are presented in Figures 2 
and 3 below. These graphs provide a clearer interpretation of the relationship between a 
significant predictor and the probability of event occurrence. More specifically, the 
expected probability of a “success” (i.e. registering to vote, or voting) relative to values 
of a significant predictor are presented in the case of the Logit models. Finally, the 
probabilities of engagement at each activism level (range 0-4) relative to the values of 
significant predictors are presented in the case of the Poisson models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted probability of registering to vote and voting by selected 
significant predictors. Predictions are based on the Adjusted Model with 
Acculturation and Economic Integration Presented in Table 6 
 
(a) Graphed results are based on the registering to vote model; (b) Graphed results 
are based on the voting model 
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Figure 4. Predicted probability of activism levels. Predictions are based on the 
Adjusted Model with Acculturation and Economic Integration Presented in Table 6 
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Chapter Four 
Discussion 
4.1 Summary of Results 
This final chapter of the dissertation restates the research problem and reviews the 
major methods used in the dissertation. The major sections of this chapter summarize the 
results and discuss their implications. While no especially surprising results were found 
between the Yemenis and Lebanese at the univariate level, the bivariate level results of 
the cultural integration model showed that when asked about participating in Arab 
culture, responses were very high, with the Lebanese group classifying that category as 
very important.  This was surprising because the Lebanese group was more established 
economically and had higher levels of integration in almost all of the other categories, 
including citizenship; and yet they rated significantly higher in terms of feeling strongly 
in participating in Arab culture than the Yemenis.  However, it should be noted that such 
significant results for the ethnicity analysis were not found to stand the test once the 
covariates were accounted in the bivariate analysis.  In other words, in the bivariate 
analysis, once I started using hypotheticals (which included correlations (when 
continuous) and cross-tabulations (if categorical) to examine unadjusted relationships 
(between the main outcomes and predictors of interest) and accounting for other 
variables, the picture changed completely.  Here it was found there was no inherent 
difference in the structure of my two groups. This finding was also verified by the 
ethnicity literature which finds that different ethnic backgrounds do lead to differences in 
political behavior, however, the Yemeni and Lebanese groups follow the same American 
model in terms of integration leading to higher rates of political participation.  In short, 
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the two groups behave differently (as I had initially assumed) but only until I account for 
economic and cultural values and that although the Lebanese and Yemeni groups vote 
and participate at different rates as a whole, once the economic and cultural variables are 
accounted for however, these differences disappear.   
Further, within the bivariate analysis, the finding that economic achievement, or 
economic integration, was the underlying reason for increased amounts of voting and 
political participation among the Yemenis and Lebanese, just as in the case of the 
literature, illustrated that there was no fundamental distinction between these two 
immigrant groups and others as they progress in U.S. society.  In short, at the bivariate 
level, there are some differences between Yemeni and Lebanese participation patterns, 
but that difference is not inherent to ethnicity and cultural integration and thus, does not 
explain the entirety of the relationship between ethnicity and political integration.  In 
brief, economic achievement, or economic integration, was found to be the underlying 
reason for increased amounts of voting and political participation among the Yemenis 
and Lebanese.  Such a finding is significant, as contrary to many stereotypes and 
assumptions, once socioeconomic status is controlled for; Yemeni immigrants participate 
at similar rates with other immigrant groups.  Such stereotypes range from depictions of 
Yemenis in Hollywood movies, such as the film, Rules of Engagement, as terrorists and 
uncivilized, to misperceptions of Yemenis among Arab-Americans as being backwards, 
uneducated and simplistic. 
Finally, at the multivariable level, what was found when I accounted for cultural 
integration within my unadjusted and adjusted models in, was that the relationship 
between ethnicity among the Yemenis and Lebanese and registering to vote disappeared; 
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however with the variable, voting, some significance in the model was found as Yemenis 
remained less likely to vote then Lebanese, thus cultural integration was positively 
associated with voting only.  However, once again, the results of the study, illustrated that 
in terms of political participation among Yemenis and Lebanese, in registering to vote, 
Yemenis were found to be less likely to register to vote than Lebanese, but these were 
simply trends or sample results being that they were not significant enough to apply to 
Yemeni and Lebanese groups on a national scale. In summary, although the assumed 
differences among Yemenis and Lebanese were verified in the univariate and bivariate 
models, conversely, in the end, once all indicators were adjusted for, the only significant 
difference among the two groups was found in economic integration levels.  In other 
words, the findings indicate that if both Lebanese and Yemenis had similar economic 
population characteristics, the effects of ethnic origin would not be important in 
explaining their participation levels.  Such findings were surprising being that it was 
assumed the model's results would illustrate a picture where a clear distinction would be 
drawn between Lebanese and Yemeni immigrants in all three integration areas. 
 
4.2 Results and Hypotheses  
    In my first of three hypotheses, in exploring the links between political 
participation and ethnicity, my aim was to consider whether or not there are in fact, 
ethnic differences between Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants in determining levels of 
political participation.  I assumed that the Lebanese respondents would have higher rates 
of political participation compared to those originating from Yemen, and that was the 
case in the bivariate comparisons.  As my literature review has shown, studies on this 
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topic have varied in terms of how much of an effect ethnicity has on the political 
participation of ethnic groups.  And in conducting my study, it is understandable why 
such conclusions have differed being that when I studied the two ethnic groups at the 
univariate and bivariate levels, ethnicity did in fact seem to impact rates of political 
participation. However, just as in my study, the literature also illustrated that above and 
beyond ethnicity, the socioeconomic status of the immigrant group was the strongest 
indicator of rates of political participation within the host society.  Therefore, at the 
univariate and bivariate levels, my first hypothesis based on ethnicity predicting that 
Lebanese respondents would have higher rates of political participation compared to the 
Yemeni respondents was confirmed in the “unadjusted model” at the bivariate level, that 
irrespective of political characteristics, Yemeni-Americans are much less likely to vote 
than Lebanese-Americans.  However, once all of the political, economic, and cultural 
variables were accounted for in the “adjusted model,” the ethnicity effect was not found 
to be statistically significant and therefore, must be rejected. 
The second hypothesis explores whether and how cultural integration and more 
specifically, ethnic differences in cultural integration affect political participation.  I 
argued that cultural integration was positively linked to political participation. I also 
proposed that cultural integration will have an attenuating effect on the previously 
examined relationship between ethnicity and political participation.  In the literature 
within this area, the cultural integration of immigrants may be significant at the level of 
the public policy sphere through, for instance, in the way the immigrants identify and 
participate in the host country political process.  The literature also revealed the 
differences among researchers in how to operationalize cultural integration, many of 
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which went beyond the control variables that I had used in my study:  language usage, 
importance of Arabic language usage, participation in Arab culture, marriage to someone 
of Arab descent, and frequency of visits to the country of origin.  The use of the cultural 
integration variable in my model eliminated any significant difference in voting rates 
between the Yemenis and Lebanese.  However, adding the cultural integration variable to 
analyze registration to vote among the two groups did decrease the levels of voting 
among Yemenis, which was in line with my hypothesis.   
 The third and final hypothesis, which explores the role of economic integration of 
immigrants on political participation, proposed that economic integration would be 
positively related to political participation; in other words, that economic integration in 
the form of home ownership, employment status and type, education and income would 
moderate the relationship between both ethnicity and cultural integration and political 
participation.  As stated in my literature review, the majority of ethnic studies in the 
realm of political participation emphasize the importance of socioeconomic status in 
developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation.   
Therefore, being that my findings here have not added to the findings already in the 
literature, when taking into account Berry's model of varied forms of social involvement, 
which notes that socio-cultural adaptation may be characterized as developing 
friendships, establishing social networks, and becoming productive in terms of 
educational or employment objectives (Berry, 2003, pp. 17-37; Castro, 2003, p. 16), 
some distinctions are then found among the literature and my findings. Much of the 
reasoning behind this notion is that immigrant communities must first adapt to their new 
economic environment in time, which then translates to their increased activity in the 
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political environment; thus integration or assimilation can be seen as a generationally-
phased process. Additionally, much of the literature on immigrant political integration 
focuses on the link between economic integration and cultural integration or 
socioeconomic integration.  However, as my dissertation results have shown, the cultural 
aspect of immigrants’ integration, consisting of variables such as frequency of contacts 
within host country and in comparison to country of origin), friendships, rules/norms 
behavior, marriages, voluntary associations, language usage and proficiency (specifically 
of English in the U.S.), is statistically insignificant when measuring rates of political 
participation among Yemeni and Lebanese-American groups. 
Variables within the economic integration model such as levels of income and 
employment all showed significant relationships with levels of political participation.  
This finding along with the results regarding the relationship between home ownership 
for the categories of voting, registering to vote and signing a petition, indicate that levels 
of political participation between the renters and owners were significant. This finding 
was also in line with the literature which emphasized the importance of socioeconomic 
status in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political 
participation.  Thus, this finding among Yemeni and Lebanese-Americans did not veer 
from the literature, as it would be assumed those who own a home as opposed to those 
who rent would more than likely feel a commitment to their new society and want to 
invest in a future within it. The literature also illustrated that differential residential 
patterns are strongly related to socioeconomic inequality, so that high proportions of 
immigrants and economic disadvantage (e.g. more unemployment, lower income levels, 
and inferior quality of housing) tend to coincide in the same urban neighborhoods (Jacobs 
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& Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 9).   Thus, I was able to find a significant relationship between 
economic integration and political participation and accept the hypothesis.   
 
4.3 Significance of Results 
My study could be considered as “groundbreaking” in that there have been no studies 
solely exploring the Yemeni community political participation and more specifically 
exploring how this community’s levels of acculturation and economic achievement 
(integration) affect their political activity in the U.S.  Further, I believe that establishing 
this work as an intra-Arab comparison, adds to the importance of the work considering, 
what I believe to be an under-emphasized and understudied diversity within the Arab 
community in the U.S.  By comparing the Yemeni and the Lebanese communities, a 
much more diverse, acculturated and economically established segment of the Arab- 
American community, I intended to demonstrate these differences and try to explain 
them.  I believe that there is a definite gap in intra-ethnic studies (particularly among 
Arab sub-ethnicities), and specifically concerning Yemeni-Americans and I hope that my 
work will help fill some of this void with regard to intra-ethnic differences in political 
participation. 
My aims for conducting this study were with the intension of broadening our 
understanding of this apparently unique segment of the United States’ immigrant 
community through testing and further developing theories on immigrant integration in a 
comparative context of Yemeni immigrants and comparatively with Lebanese-
Americans, a group with high levels of attributed integration.  Such an area of research is 
significant in that there has been relatively little effort to understand the varied patterns 
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and problems of immigrant integration even within established cultural categories such as 
“Arab.”   
The results of my study were significant in several areas.  Firstly, when 
accounting for cultural integration in my adjusted model for acculturation, it did not 
remove the relationship between ethnicity and political participation as it was found that 
the more culturally integrated you are the more likely to be politically active.  Although 
the model’s results that the higher the levels of  cultural integration, the more the Yemeni 
and Lebanese groups participate in politics was not different than what research had 
found among other ethnic communities, however, my assumption was that there would be 
a distinct difference when studying the often isolated and traditional Yemeni community.  
The study had also shown that, not unlike other ethnic communities, once the economic 
variables were added, as were illustrated in the graphs, cultural integration was found to 
be statistically insignificant.   Secondly, for economic integration, once it was accounted 
for at the multivariable level, the only four variables that mattered in terms of registration 
to vote among these two groups were:  Income, Age, being a Female and being an 
Independent in Party ideology and the effects of ethnicity went away.   
 
4.4 Analysis and Recommendations 
The DAAS was conducted as a result of the war on terrorism despite the topic being 
almost too sensitive to fully grasp the depth of the community’s position on 
transnationalist activities; it was deemed as essential in providing researchers and policy 
makers with increased knowledge on the significance of this community and how to use 
such data resources to improve their living environments and societies.   
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This study leads to further questions on how and why the Yemeni immigrant 
community's economic standing makes it is less integrated than other immigrant groups, 
namely a more established Arab community, Lebanese-Americans; there are several 
plausible explanations concerning their behavior.  First, there is the argument of “place 
versus culture,” in which there is an ethnic residential concentration of Yemeni 
immigrants as noted in the literature in primarily two areas of Metro Detroit, Southeast 
Dearborn and Hamtramck.  It is known from the literature that proximity to other co-
ethnics has weak effects on voting participation and this was found to be the case across 
immigrant generations (Ramakrishnana & Espenshade, 2001, p. 891).  Place of residence 
can also modify the relationship between acculturation and duration of residence.  Living 
in an ethnic enclave may hinder social integration into the host country irrespective of 
years of residence, with subsequent effects on expected outcomes (Mouanoutoua, Brown, 
Cappelletty, & Levine, 1991, pp. 512-513).  Therefore, such living arrangements may 
hinder Yemeni-Americans' economic opportunities resulting in their marginalization as 
opposed to their integration, as Berry describes in his studies  The Yemeni migrant 
community, specifically the Northern Yemenis, tend to reside near their place of 
employment, allowing them to walk to work.  To compare within the Yemeni 
community, as the literature has shown, Southern Yemenis, or Adenis, tend instead to 
live scattered about within a broader geographical setting, or throughout the downriver 
region (Abraham & Shryock, 2000, p. 118) These residential differences may indeed be 
impacting integration patterns among Yemeni migrant communities and if we can 
integrate such a population, then anyone can integrate and since everything is going 
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global which is directly affecting how communities work, these integration efforts should 
be globalized and integrated on a community scale.   
The vast majority of the literature on immigrant integration analyzes the impact of 
some levels of cultural integration and has shown that it has an effect on increased 
political participation for ethnic groups.  However, my findings have shown that this does 
not tell the complete story as economic integration is of primary importance in 
integration patterns, also strongly illustrated in such literature. Such findings in 
combination with more localized attributes of the Yemeni-American community which 
have not been thoroughly researched nor understood, heed the importance of 
understanding this community and altering its current trend of being an alienated/isolated 
community within the U.S.  The few studies that have been done on Yemeni immigrants 
in the U.S. illustrate integration trends more in line with the European model of 
integration12 wherein European countries generally do identify themselves as 
multinational in contrast to the American model which supposedly culminates in almost 
complete integration by the second generation of immigrants.  However, in reality, if we 
are to compare Yemeni migrants with the largest Muslim migrants to Europe, the Turks, 
settled largely in Germany, and the Moroccans, settled largely in France, both groups 
entered Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s as a predominantly male population of low-
skilled workers, just as the case with the Yemeni migrants to the U.S.  And also the 
integration of the Turks and Moroccans was, and still is, often thought to be highly 
                                                          
12
 Based on the European integration model, in considering France, which has one of the largest Muslim 
communities in Europe most of whom hail from Northern Africa, immigrant integration was an inherent 
part of the nation following the French Revolution whereby national integration as a whole was viewed as 
political:  members of the national society are integrated by individual citizenship, following a universalist 
view of the citizen” (Schnapper, Krief and Peignard, 1998, 27).   
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problematic. In essence, if conforming to the research, most have noted that the groups 
would be considered as part of the formation of an underclass and seem to satisfy Portes' 
conditions for downward assimilation13  
Therefore, it is imperative that there is a deeper understanding of this segment of our 
population in an effort to reduce ignorance and fear and to allow for greater integration 
and acceptance. As noted in the literature, government has an interest in policies that 
enable new settlers to develop a sense of belonging to the wider community, participate 
in all aspects of social, cultural and economic life, and be confident that they are coming 
into a country that is able to accept their difference and value their contribution 
(Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, & O’Neill, 2005, p. 86).  Such positive settlement outcomes 
benefit both the immigrant and host society, a current question of importance not only in 
North America but in Europe and elsewhere (Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, & O’Neill, 2005, 
p. 86).  These results are also important for discussions on immigrant incorporation.  As 
we have seen, the political incorporation of immigrants into their new country of 
residence is to a certain extent inevitable because immigrants’ individual efforts will 
often lead them to integrate through the labor market and through other economic and 
social institutions, ultimately providing them with the resources and motivations to 
become politically involved. A lack of political integration can lead to the creation of a 
voiceless, alienated and racially defined underclass, which can have a variety of 
consequences and might ultimately lead to increased racial tensions or other forms of 
conflict (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 359). By encouraging political involvement among 
immigrants they can make their voices heard constructively which would in turn, 
                                                          
13
 Immigrant groups may experience “downward” assimilation into the mainstream (native) lower class 
cultures while underachieving in education and in the job market (Portes, 2007). 
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improve their own identification with the adopted new society.  Furthermore, promoting 
inclusion in the political system is likely to generate recognition of the authority of that 
system, which then results in higher levels of confidence and fulfillment within the 
democratic process.  Thus, within immigrant communities, individuals may choose to 
accept (or not) aspects of the host society’s culture; however, there are also social, 
political, economic and other specific challenges to integration that, if understood and 
overcome, could benefit the society as whole.   
 
 4.5 Limitations  
There are however, some limitations found in the methodological and analytical 
implications for the Detroit Arab-American Study.  Firstly, there were limitations due to 
the sample of the population.  For instance, DAAS would have been better served if the 
sample was a national sample because there are specifics in the sample selected within 
the constraints of the tri-county area of Metro Detroit.  For example, Lebanese in 
California or North Dakota will be different than Lebanese in Detroit as those Lebanese 
or Yemenis who reside in regions with smaller Arab-American communities or not 
within any at all, would not have the enclave mentality particular to the Metro Detroit 
area, therefore those Arab-Americans are forced to acculturate.  Thus, my statements are 
contingent to the nature of my study, however, in the future; with additional time and 
funding, the study can be improved by enlarging the studied sample as well as retrieving 
data from other more varied communities. 
Secondly, in terms of the methodology, not all important and relevant questions 
pertaining to transnational involvement could be included in the survey instrument.  
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Furthermore, respect for the apprehensions and sensitivities of the Arab-American 
community, as well as the “protection of human subjects” requirements of the University 
of Michigan’s Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, also restricted the 
questions that could be asked about a variety of subjects. In terms of the topic of 
transnationalism, in analyzing the context of the war on terrorism, the topic was almost 
too sensitive to fully grasp the depth of the community’s position on transnationalist 
activities. Thus, for example, it was unfeasible to ask about sending funds to the Arab 
Middle East, including funds going to charities as well as to family and friends.  As a 
result, questions on transnationalism were primarily restricted to the importance of 
visiting family and friends in the Middle East, rather than whether and how often they 
made such visits to the Middle East. Therefore, transnationalism within the community 
should be analyzed by considering a range of questions that probe transnational activities 
through areas such as communication.  In summary, these limitations should be taken 
into consideration when analyzing the findings in the report.  
Additionally, it should be recalled that the DAAS data is set in a particular 
historical moment, one marked by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 
subsequent U.S. “war on terrorism.” Further, while the special character of this period 
may have an impact on Americans’ outlook generally, it has particular significance for 
Arab-Americans, due to the apparent ethnicity of the suspected terrorists on September 
11th in congruence with the mass media’s delineation of this group as well as Islam, and 
perhaps most especially for transnationalism among Arab-Americans. This means, as 
noted earlier, that patterns and relationships reported here may or may not obtain in more 
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“normal” times, during periods when Arab-Americans face fewer barriers14 to interaction 
with the Arab Middle East and fewer questions are raised about their loyalty to the 
United States. This, too, is an empirical question to be investigated in the future, for 
which the present study again provides baseline data. 
Finally, this study relied solely on the data from the DAAS, which as noted above 
has its limitations.  It was my hope and intention to use the DAAS in combination with 
my own qualitative survey of the Yemeni and Lebanese Metro Detroit population in 
order to enhance the ethnology aspect of the study, however, due to the lack of sufficient 
time and funding, such an expanded project can be accomplished in a future study.   
 
4.6 Future Studies  
The ethnicity-centered literature had its own limitations when applied to this 
particular study.  Due to the limited amount of literature on the Arab-American 
population, most specifically the Yemeni population; it was necessary to borrow from the 
literature of studies involving ethnicity analyses on larger ethnic groups, such as Latin 
Americans and Asian-Americans. Although there is some literature to be found on 
Lebanese and Yemenis, as presented in this study’s literature review, it is not as 
comprehensive as the other segments of the U.S. population.   Thus, in utilizing literature 
based on other ethnicities much of this study was based on borrowing from groups whose 
full correspondence with the Arab experience might be questioned.  However, this study 
                                                          
14
 The U.S. Government has increasingly scrutinized Arab-American ties to the Arab Middle East in the 
Post-9/11 period and has sought to disrupt networks of transnational interaction, particularly but not 
exclusively those relating to financial transfers. Detroit News, August 16, 2006. 
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is a start and the paradigm may be enlarged in future studies that may use this particular 
study as a springboard.   
Impacts on the Second-Generation of Immigrant and Sojourner Families 
      One particularly important area of potential research in line with cultural 
integration within migrant studies is the essential issue of generational differences and 
sojourner and/or settler status.  Generational differences in this study will be extremely 
significant and pertinent.  For instance, in my pilot study on this issue, several 
interviewees noted that the degree of integration for the younger generation of Yemeni-
Americans depended on how old the youth were when they emigrated to the U.S. or if 
they were born here. As Orellana, Thorne, Lam & Chee note, “family migration 
processes in many different ways are shaped by sociopolitical circumstances, global 
economic conditions, available resources, and cultural practices, and beliefs; without firm 
roots in the country of origin, children often come to identify with their new homeland in 
ways that parents may not” (Orellana, Thorne, Lam & Chee, 2004, p. 2). Additionally, I 
have not found relevant research that considers the economic and political connections 
that the Yemeni expatriate community holds with their country of origin and its role in 
their assimilation in the U.S.   
Finally, there is no research to be found which considers the distinct differences 
between Yemeni-Americans from the southern and northern regions of Yemen and their 
levels of assimilation here in the U.S.  However, in regards to Lebanese immigrants and 
distinctions in their levels of assimilation within the U.S., according to Kristine J. 
Ajrouch and Abdi M. Kusow, “religious affiliation is an important organizing mechanism 
in Lebanon, and a major component of one’s political and social identity” (Ajrouch & 
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Kusow, 2007, p. 79). Further, religion and sect have to be designated on all legal 
identifications, regardless of personal wishes and these processes also produce a 
stratification system based on religious affiliation, with Christians historically occupying 
the highest levels, followed by Sunni Muslims, and last the Shi’a Muslims (Salibi, 1988, 
pp. 235-235).  Also, the Shi’a of southern Lebanon have occupied the lowest end of the 
social strata and possessed the least amount of power and privilege (Ajami, 1986, p. 137).  
Therefore, their low position within the Lebanese social order, in addition to the civil war 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, concurrently further suppressed and marginalized the Shi’a 
which in turn, provoked their vast immigration movements.   
   In terms of the research incorporating an analysis of second-generation 
immigrants, traditional theories of immigrant integration consider assimilation to be a 
linear process, whereby the economic and social conditions of individuals and ethnic 
groups improve over each succeeding generation (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, p. 
870).  Over the past decade, several studies have challenged the applicability of “straight-
line” theories of immigrant adaptation to the “new” second generation (Gans, 1992; 
Portes and Zhou, 1993; Rumbaut, 1997; Zhou, 1997).15 Many of the revisionist 
perspectives present a model of “segmented assimilation” in which different group 
characteristics (such as, for e.g., generational patterns, social and economic conditions, 
linguistic and cultural barriers) and modes of incorporation lead to diverse outcomes that 
can include second generation declines (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, pp. 871-
873). In short, traditional theories of political participation have examined the effects of 
individual resources, social incorporation, and political mobilization on such integration 
                                                          
15
 Given that economic downturn the future opportunities of all younger generations in the U.S. may not be 
as robust as their forebears, and hence might affect generational integration for immigrant families.  
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aspects as voter turnout.  Additionally, comparisons are usually only made among natural 
and foreign-born citizens; therefore separating out the second generation provides some 
additional significant insights on the development of political incorporation among 
immigrants.  Moving to a new culture can carry difficulties and challenges for sojourner 
family members (Sluzki, 1979, p. 383) as they have to deal not only with the attainment 
of a new language but with dissimilar cultural values, beliefs, and customs. 
   It is not difficult to discern the relationship between the strong ideals and loyalty 
held to by Yemenis for their religion and secondly, for their culture as the crux of their 
identity. Their desire to sustain such parts of their identity protected them when they are 
far from Yemen, but this may have been true for other immigrant groups in U.S. history 
as well. For purposes of future studies within this area, I would focus on Yemeni-
Americans, with consideration of sojourner families to consist of families who intend to 
relocate to Yemen and may have stayed in the host society longer than they had initially 
intended, most likely due to economic or war-related issues.  I would assume the second 
and third generations of these sojourner families, however, would not remain as 
sojourners and eventually would become native, which can be studied in a future 
expansion of this dissertation.  Thus, immigrant and sojourner children alike are more 
likely to adapt more rapidly to new cultural values, behaviors, and communication styles, 
etc. so that they will be accepted and included within peer relationships at school (Maria 
Beatriz Torres, 2001, p. 37).  However, some communities might exercise deliberate 
efforts to keep children from blending with outsider groups, and might retard their 
integration.  One would want to evaluate this for a reputedly semi-isolated community 
such as the Yemenis. 
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For those Yemeni-Americans’ whose outlook concerning migration is perceived 
as being only temporary, loyalty to their background and culture is likely to be easily 
achievable.   However, it would seem only natural that immigrants’ children and their 
children’s children and so forth, would not be as steadfast with older beliefs and thus, 
adaptation and acculturation will occur. Indeed one can also conceive of immigrant 
children, perhaps of the later generations, becoming more nationalistic for the country of 
origin than their upward striving parents. Such questions about the parent-child 
relationship among immigrant families will likely be found among the Yemeni-American 
families, leading perhaps to communication breakdowns within the family.  Moreover, as 
it is with most immigrant families, furthering their children’s education and language 
abilities is an important component in their integration into their host society. 
      Recent scholarship has suggested that the societal integration of today's new 
second generation is likely to be “segmented and to take various pathways to adulthood, 
depending on a variety of conditions and contexts, vulnerabilities and resources” (Gans, 
1992; Portes & Zhou, 1993; cf. Abramson, 1981 as cited in Rumbaut, 1994, p. 753). 
According to Yunjoo Park, sojourner families resided in the U.S. temporarily “for 
extended periods (three to seven years) and encountered a complex set of issues with 
regard to children's language and culture development, children's identity development, 
and relationships within the family as parents dealt with balancing bilingualism and 
biculturalism” (Park, 2005, p. vii).  In regards to this dissertation, the general 
acculturation literature has shown clearly that most immigrants prefer integration that is, 
retaining their culture of origin while adapting to the new culture (Berry & Sam, 1997, p. 
431).  With reference to identity, the equivalent concept is having a bicultural or 
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integrated identity: feeling that one is both part of an ethnic group and part of the larger 
society (Phinney, 2001, p. 495). Therefore, the likelihood of identity integration is 
connected to parental ethnic socialization, social status, and parent-child relationships. 
The children's ethnic self-identities strongly tend to mirror the perceptions of their 
parents' (and especially their mother's) own ethnic self-identities, as if they were 
reflections in an ethnic looking-glass (Rumbaut, 2005, p. 790).  
      Moreover, sojourner families will ultimately be subsumed in a dual culture 
shock:  the first shock will come in their efforts to adapt to their new host culture; the 
second shock will come when (if) they return to their native country and attempt to 
readapt to their home culture (Sueda & Wiseman, 1991, p. 652). Indeed, I would expect 
that if immigrant family structures are considered sojourners, then parental 
characteristics and the quality of parent-child relationships should have significant 
negative effects on the integration levels of second generation children of sojourner 
immigrants.  Thus, it is expected that future research will offer insight on adaptations 
among first generation Yemeni-Americans and their children and whether or not it differs 
from immigrant communities emigrating from other regions of the Arab world to the 
United States. 
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This study is intended to extend our understanding of immigrant political 
integration by analyzing Yemeni immigrants’ attitudes toward integration into North 
American society, exploring the case of Yemeni-Americans, a group reputedly resistant 
to integration, in both Dearborn and Hamtramck, Michigan, and comparatively assessing 
those data with already published data on Lebanese-Americans, retrieved from the U.S. 
Census Bureau and the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS).  Relying on an existing 
theoretical framework on immigrant integration based on sociological and cognitive 
approaches and my own theoretical model on transnational dimensions related to 
political, economic, and cultural integration, I will examine a series of hypotheses against 
the quantitative data from DAAS with the extracted subpopulations of Yemeni and 
Lebanese populations in Dearborn and Hamtramck. Specifically, I hypothesize that 
Yemeni-Americans overall will be less integrated than their Lebanese-American 
counterparts. The reasons for these differences are likely to be explained by cultural and 
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economic differences ranging from ethnic orientations to the country of origin, social 
demographics, language orientation, to political stances.    
For the data collection, I will utilize the data from the DAAS to explore the 
general attitudes on key dimensions of integration, focusing especially on political 
participation, as well as factors associated with reluctance toward integration. Yemeni 
data will be compared to Lebanese counterpart data to highlight reasons for varied 
patterns and degrees of integration among segments of the Arab-American community. 
          I expect to find that Yemeni-Americans are less integrated than their Lebanese-
American counterparts.  The reasons for these differences are likely to relate to a series of 
variables which include income and educational levels, length of stay in the Detroit area, 
and extent of U.S. language and degree of continued attachment to the country of origin. 
The implications from the research will address how and at what rates Yemeni 
immigrants in comparison to Lebanese  immigrants, at various economic levels, adjust 
and participate politically and culturally most readily in their new host societies. This 
analysis will offer insight into expected variations in immigrant integration among Arab-
Americans. 
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